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## Rifts in the Universe

*By the Same Author:*  
The Foundations of Psychology.

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In Memory of James Wesley Cooper  
of the Class of 1865, Yale College





# Rifts in the Universe

A Study of  
The Historic Dichotomies and Modalities  
of Being

By Jared Sparks Moore, Ph.D.


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To the Memory of  
Josiah Royce  
*Truly Synthetic Philosopher*





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# Rifts in the Universe

## Introduction

FROM the beginning of time, man has tended to split his universe into two distinct parts, and thus to dichotomize it into a duoverse. Of the rifts resulting from this persistent inclination to divide in order the better to understand, by far the most abysmal is the chasm between mind or spirit and matter, which has played such a prominent part in philosophy since classic times. Other divisions in the field of reality are such as those between phenomena and noumena, existences and subsistences, facts and values, etc. Some of these dichotomies are open to criticism on the ground that they present as distinct species of reality what are essential aspects of all reality; others are defective in their omission of some third equally distinct but neglected species; and all are in one way or another misleading.

With regard to the mind-body distinction, for example, the question is decidedly apposite whether after all man may not be a *trichotomy*. That he is so has doubtless been maintained by many theologians, but with an interpretation open to serious criticism from the standpoint of general metaphysics; whereas the innumerable philosophers who have considered the so-called "mind-body problem" have proposed solutions which are in every instance based on the hypothesis of a *two-fold* distinction—whether of substances, attributes, aspects, or what not. In our sections II, 2, and II, 3d, a suggestion is offered which it is thought is new, and



which it is hoped may have some advantages over any of those now in the field.

Each of the divisions or "rifts" which we are to consider in the ensuing pages has received the attention of many commentators in the past, but the task of viewing them in their relation to one another, and comparing their relative merits, seems to have been largely if not wholly neglected. In the present work, therefore, it is proposed (1) to examine as briefly as possible some of the more important of these dichotomies;<sup>1</sup> (2) to correlate them with one another; and (3) to inquire into the various methods by which all false or inadequate diremptions of reality may be resolved, in order that a more comprehensive view of the world of being may be attained.

Pertinent to our general problem will be also (4) a consideration of the various allied concepts to that of Being which are in common use among philosophers—such as Reality, Existence, Actuality, and their opposites. These, taking "Being" as *summum genus* or principal concept, I denominate "Modalities" of Being, and a discussion of them constitutes our fourth task. Lastly, (5) it may be of value to draw some final correlations between these various modalities and the dichotomies of our earlier discussion.

<sup>1</sup> To consider any one of these dichotomies with the care which they all deserve would be an endless task, and we can give them only summary consideration here.

# I

## The Dichotomies of Being

1. *Being* vs. *Becoming*. Virtually the first dichotomy to meet us in the history of philosophy, and one of the most persistent ever since, is that between Being and Becoming, Permanence and Change, Things and Processes, the Static and the Dynamic conceptions of reality. From the first philosophers of Greece to the neo-realists and the mathematical philosophers of the present day, the real has been defined as the permanent: from Heraclitus to Bergson, the advocates of Becoming have cried that all things flow. And yet all along there have been those wiser ones who have taught that any true view of reality must allow for both aspects—not that some things persist and some things change, not that the world is made up of things *and* processes; but that all entities undergo change, and yet remain identical with themselves through all this change.

Allied to the division just considered is the problem of Space, Time, and Eternity. Either (a) *Space* is taken as the principle of Permanence, and set over against *Time* as the principle of Change; or (b) we have the *Temporal* or changing opposed to that which is *Eternal* and abiding. The best philosophy of the present day, however, learning both from the errors of the past and from the relativist physics of today, sees in Space-Time one great principle of the form of material things,

and in the Eternal-Immense that which comprehends and underlies all Time and Space.

2. *Substance* vs. *Attribute*. Equally primitive with the Being-Becoming distinction, though not always known by the name here given it, is the contrast between Substance and Attribute (or Accident), Things and their Qualities. Often the two divisions have been combined—Substance being viewed as the permanent substratum underlying and uniting the constantly changing Attributes. From the beginning, philosophers have sought for the fundamental Substance of things, and have viewed the world of changing phenomena as merely a world of half-unreal Attributes of this only real Substance. Substance is also described as that in which the Attributes *inhere*: in its most recent form (as defined in the system of McTaggart<sup>2</sup>), a substance is anything which *has* attributes, and is not itself an attribute. The best usage regards Substance, not as something added to the attributes (Locke's "unknowable somewhat"), nor as merely the sum-total of the attributes, but as *the attributes in their unity*: the real tree, for example, is not merely the roots, trunk, leaves, sap, etc., in the aggregate, nor something added to these; rather, these elements in their living organic unity constitute the substance of the tree.

Allied distinctions are that of Spinoza between the one Substance with its Attributes, and the various *Modes* (*v. 4a, inf.*); and (a) the logical distinction between *Terms* and their *Relations*. The former of these

<sup>2</sup> *The Nature of Existence*, vol. I.

is so bound up with the One-Many dichotomy which we shall soon consider, that we shall postpone its discussion for the present. The logical distinction, however, draws attention to a defect in the main dichotomy: *viz.*, that quality and attribute are not identical concepts, but that, rather, Attributes are of two kinds—Qualities and Relations. Terms may represent either Substances or Qualities, but the Relation which binds the terms of a proposition together is a further kind of Attribute. Perhaps, too, Quantity should be added as a third kind of Attribute. Finally, another logical distinction within the field of attributes (b) is that between those attributes which are *essential* to the existence of a thing (differentia and properties), and those which are *accidental* or occasional only.

3. *Form* vs. *Matter*. This distinction appears in embryo from the beginning in the contrasts between the Milesians and the Pythagoreans, the Love and Hate and the four elements of Empedocles, etc., and since its coming into fruition under Aristotle has played a prominent part throughout the history of philosophy. In recent years, when the traditional division was beginning to show signs of having outworn its usefulness, we find it revived in (a) the *Essence-Existence* distinction of the critical realists.<sup>3</sup> The precise meanings of the contrasted terms have varied almost more than in any of the other dichotomies; but, in general, Matter has cor-

<sup>3</sup> This distinction itself, of course, is a venerable one, but has acquired a new significance in the writings of the contemporary critical realists.

responded to Substance, as that which, without Form or Attributes, would be nothing; and Form has been regarded as that which gives meaning, distinctness, character to Matter, since it is by virtue of the Attributes that we know Substance. Similarly, to the critical realists, the Essence is the datum of immediate intuition, and Existence is known only through Essence.

Allied to Aristotle's distinction of Form and Matter is (b) the same philosopher's dichotomy of *Potentiality* and *Actuality*. Matter is Potentiality, Form is the energizing principle which when infused into Matter makes the potential Actual. The true Substance to Aristotle is the actual union (Entelechy) of Matter and Form; though he admits the lesser substantiality of Matter (as substratum) or Form (the Platonic Idea) taken alone. The Potentiality-Actuality distinction, however, is essentially a distinction within the field of Becoming (Events, Processes). Substances are actual Entities: change is a passage in a Substance of Potentiality into Actuality.

Finally, we have a third allied dichotomy—(c) that between the *Universal* and the *Individual* (or Particular). In the Aristotelian metaphysics, the Form is the Universal principle, and the Entelechy is the individual which manifests Form in Matter. This is the true or "first substance," the Universal being substance only after a second order. So, with the critical realists today, Essence is the Universal, and the Individual is a union of Essence and Existence.

Before leaving this general division of things, it may be worth while to note that our modern distinction (d)



between the *Formal* or *Abstract Sciences* (logic and mathematics) and the *Content* or *Concrete* ("material" or "descriptive") *Sciences* is based upon the dichotomy of Form *vs.* Matter.

4. *The One and the Many.* One of the most persistent of all philosophical problems since the days of the controversy between Zeno the Eleatic and his pluralizing antagonists has been the problem of the One and the Many, or the Whole and the Parts. This also is the first dichotomy we have studied (with the possible exception of the first one of all) on which a division of metaphysical schools has been based—the age-long division between the quantitative (or numerical) Monists (Singularists) and the Pluralists. On the monistic side we find several allied dichotomies: with Spinoza, the distinction becomes that between (a) the one *Substance* and the many *Modes*; for modern absolute idealism, (b) the *Absolute* rather than Substance is the One, and is contrasted with the *Relative* Many; and in all systems which tend toward monism, and yet regard reality as both One and Many, the problem becomes that of (c) the *World* and the *Individual*—of saving the reality of the individual<sup>4</sup> in a monistic universe. Pluralists, on the other hand, incline to deny the seriousness of the problem, and to view the World as merely an *aggregate* of individual atoms or other units,

<sup>4</sup> For the pure monist, indeed, the Whole is the only true Individual; whereas for the pluralist, the Whole has no individuality at all. But in the text, I am describing the position of the more moderate monists.



or at best as a *system* of such units (*e.g.*, recent “personal idealism”).

Taking the synthetic view that reality is in some sense both One and Many, we find that most of the other dichotomies may be viewed either (A)<sup>5</sup> from the standpoint of the Whole, or (B) from that of the Many. Thus, the Being-Becoming dichotomy (1A) becomes, from the standpoint of the Parts (1B), the distinction between Entities (things) and Events (processes); and so with others to be considered later.

5. *Spirit* (Mind, Intelligence) vs. *Matter* (Nature). Though considerably later in its clear formulation than any of the dichotomies already discussed, this has been by far the most influential of all metaphysical distinctions throughout the greater part of the history of thought, at least since the time of Plotinus. The most fundamental classification of metaphysical systems is based on it—psychophysical Dualism, which teaches the equal and distinct reality of both; psychophysical (qualitative) Monism, which reduces them to one; and the various forms of the latter, which are distinguished according to whether this one kind of reality is defined in terms of Matter, of Mind or Spirit, of both (*e.g.*, Spinoza), or of neither (*e.g.*, contemporary neutral monism).

From the standpoint of the Many (B), we have the

<sup>5</sup> For convenience in reference, I shall use numbers to identify the leading dichotomies, small letters to indicate the allied subordinate dichotomies, and large letters to refer to the Whole (A) and the Parts (B) respectively.

allied distinctions between (a) *Spirits* (Souls, Minds) and *Bodies* (or Spirit *vs.* Flesh, Mind *vs.* Brain, etc.); and between (b) *Ideas* and *Things*, or mental phenomena and physical phenomena; and the division of the field of science between (c) *Psychology* (the Mental Sciences) and the *Material* (Physical) *Sciences*.

Recent idealistic criticism has quite rightly protested against the tendency to confuse or identify idealism with mentalism. Mentalism is to be opposed to Materialism on the basis of the general Mind-Matter antithesis; Idealism is rather to be opposed either to Realism on the basis of the Idea-Thing distinction (not, of course, the ideal-real distinction which we consider later—§10), or more importantly to Naturalism on the basis of the vitally significant Fact-Value distinction (§9h) to which we shall return subsequently (see also Appendix A).

But back of the entire difficulty lies the profound error of confusing or identifying (A) Mind (Intelligence, Reason) with Spirit; or, on the level of the Parts (B), Mind with Soul, or either with Spirit. In histories of philosophy it is almost universally the custom to use the terms Spiritualism and Mentalism (when the latter is used at all), Spirit and Mind, etc., quite indifferently. This is a grave error, but its seriousness can be appreciated more fully after we have considered the important Subject-Object (§8) and Fact-Value (§9) distinctions.

The next three dichotomies are intimately related to this one.

6. *God* (the Creator) vs. *the World* (Creation, the Universe, the Cosmos, Matter). Any of the metaphysical systems named in the preceding section (even materialism) may be either *theistic* or *atheistic*. In the former case, the present dichotomy adds itself to the immediately preceding one. God is regarded as Pure Spirit (or, in materialism, as composed of a refined kind of matter), the World as a compound of Spirit and Matter. Generally this dichotomy fuses with that which we have numbered 4: God is the One, the World represents the Many; God is Substance (*Natura Naturans*), the World is composed of the Modes of Substance (*Natura Naturata*); God is the Absolute, the World the Relative. The World in this sense is usually thought of as an orderly system ("cosmos") of Individuals, thereby removing the problem of the relation between World and Individual which bothers the absolute monist. For the theist, furthermore, God is Creator, the World is His Creation. Finally, if Matter is taken as the antithesis of God (as in Neoplatonism and allied doctrines), the World may be regarded as a compound or mixture of both (e.g., Numenius, and in a certain sense Plato and Aristotle).

7. *Nature* vs. *Man*. On the side of the Creation a new dichotomy arises, analogous to but not identical with the fifth on our list, between Nature, or the purely material creation, and Man, who is both material and spiritual. From the standpoint of the Many (B), this corresponds to the allied dichotomy of *Things* vs. *Persons* (Selves). This division is also the basis for the

historic distinction in the field of education between (a) *the Sciences* and *the Humanities*—the former regarded as being concerned solely with the material universe (hence, “the *natural* sciences”), and the latter with the world of persons. Recent educational theory, however, paralleling the advance in the fields of mental and social science, and the increasing recognition that man (“human nature”) is, in large measure at least, a part and product of nature, places a considerably lower estimate than formerly upon the significance of this distinction. In common with the whole Nature-Man dichotomy, also, the distinction of the Sciences *vs.* the Humanities is defective in ignoring that important field of human knowledge to which the old-fashioned term “Divinity” is most appropriately applied.

8. *Subject vs. Object.* The basis of this profoundly significant dichotomy is quite different from that which underlies the three previous ones, but the distinction itself is interwoven throughout all of these. That which fundamentally distinguishes Persons or Selves from Things which are Not-Selves is that Things are Pure Objects, whereas every Person or Self is a Subject-Object.<sup>6</sup> Every Entity *or* Process (1B) of which we can

<sup>6</sup> The distinction is not, be it noted, between Subjects and Objects, but between Pure Objects and Subject-Objects (there neither is nor can be a “Pure Subject”), or between the Subject and the Object aspects of reality. Furthermore, in our identification of Persons and Selves, I am not attempting to predetermine the question as to whether self-consciousness appears in the course of evolution before the emergence of man. Up to the present time there is certainly no thoroughly convincing evidence that any organisms below man are

think at all, ourselves included, is thereby an Object;<sup>7</sup> but we who think them are in each case Subject as well.

The Subject-Object dichotomy is not to be identified with the allied distinction between (a) *Self* and *Not-Self*, since, as we have seen, every Self is both Subject and Object—I may be conscious of myself or of what is not myself, the Object differing in the two cases but the Subject remaining the same. Consequently, there is a second allied dichotomy which nevertheless we must also take care not to identify with the main one—namely, that between (b) *Ego* and *Non-Ego*: Ego is myself (not merely any self) as Subject-Object, Non-Ego is any Object which is not myself. But, since I myself may be my own Object (in “self-consciousness,” and in introspection), we have a third allied dichotomy within the field of the Ego, first made famous by William James, between (c) the *I* (myself as Subject) and the *Me* (myself as Object). Finally, the world of Objects may be dichotomized, from the point of view of each Ego, into (d) *Me* (myself as Object) and *Not-Me* (the not-self as Object to “I”).


The various dichotomies under this head may be correlated as follows:

self-conscious, but so far as they may be so they must be regarded as at least embryo persons or selves, though for our present purpose it suffices to place them in the impersonal group with other “things” (*i.e.*, as “living things”).

<sup>7</sup> I am not here assuming the idealist position that all entities and processes *are as such* Objects, but merely state that if we think them at all we *think of them* as Objects.



TABLE I



There are here, as indicated, really two distinct fundamental antitheses—(I) that between Self and Not-Self in general, and (II) that between *myself* (Ego) and what is not myself (Non-Ego). (The members of each dichotomy are connected by horizontal broken lines in this and the following tables.)

9. *Phenomena* vs. *Noumena*. In recent years the Spirit-Matter dichotomy which for so many centuries has almost completely dominated metaphysics has shown signs of yielding first place to another, which is indeed in many respects a more fundamental one—I mean the dichotomy of *Phenomena* or *Facts* vs. *Values* or *Meanings*. This is the favorite representative today of the dichotomy of *Phenomena* vs. *Noumena* (or *Things-in-Themselves*) first made famous by Kant, in that *Values* like *Noumena* are usually regarded by those who draw the distinction as in some way more real or more profoundly real than “mere” *Phenomena*. I wish to consider first the Kantian distinction; then the more recent variation of it, along with other allied dichotomies; and finally to suggest a usage which seems to me of more value for the purposes of contemporary thought.



The Kantian distinction is familiar. *Phenomena* are things as they appear to human consciousness, but Things-as-they-are-in-Themselves are unknowable by man: a Divine Intelligence, however, *may* know Things-in-Themselves, in which case they would be to Him objects of intellectual intuition—*i.e.*, Noumena—rather than of sense-perception as with man. Things, then, are for Kant Phenomena, as they appear to human consciousness, and Noumena, as they hypothetically are known to God; and the real dichotomy is this, rather than the one more customarily drawn between Phenomena and Things-in-Themselves.

(a) The allied *Fact-Value* distinction came forward originally under the theologizing impetus of Albert Ritschl. According to this thinker, *Science* has the world of existing facts for its realm, *Religion* the world of non-existent values, and each is sharply opposed to the other. Religion is concerned solely with values, and its judgments do not assert or imply the real existence of their objects: scientific judgments, on the other hand, are judgments of fact, and to science questions of value are simply not pertinent. Later criticism has considerably modified the sharpness of this antithesis, without denying the fundamental truths behind it. To religion, indeed, value is everything, *mere* fact nothing; but religion insists, nevertheless, and even bases itself, upon the postulate of the reality (and, in Höffding's well-known phrase, the "conservation") of the great spiritual Values—Truth, Beauty, Goodness; God, Freedom, Immortality. To religion, in other words, Values are *the* Ultimate Realities, and therefore something far

more "real" than mere "facts"; and in no sense can such realities be denominated "phenomena." To science, on the other hand, facts, phenomena, in their relations to one another are all-sufficient, and questions of value become of entirely subordinate significance, if they are not ignored altogether.

Allied dichotomies to those just considered have been drawn between (b) the *Empirical* (that which is the object of experience—*i.e.*, *phenomena*) and the *Transcendental* (that which is presupposed in experience—*i.e.*, the Kantian categories, the Soul, God, etc.); (c) the *Immanent* (that which is *in* experience) and the *Transcendent* (that which lies *beyond* all possible experience, and so on Kantian principles can not be known); (d) the *World of Description* (*i.e.*, of phenomena, which as such can be described) and the *World of Appreciation* (*i.e.*, of noumena, values, meanings, etc., which can not be described, but must be apprehended immediately by the individual). The first two of these are essentially Kantian distinctions, the third a post-Kantian development under the ægis of the absolute idealists (*e.g.*, Royce).

Analogous to the opposition of facts and values is (e) the dichotomy of *Causes* vs. *Purpose* (Efficient vs. Final Causes) as principles of explanation. The question "why" with reference to any phenomenon may be answered either by stating the cause which brought that phenomenon into existence, or by declaring the purpose for which it exists. In a familiar and extremely significant passage in the *Phædo*,<sup>8</sup> Socrates relates how

<sup>8</sup> Pp. 96-99. The quotations are from Jowett's translation.

he had hoped to find in the philosophy of Anaxagoras an explanation of the phenomena of nature, and how that hope had been disappointed, because instead of explaining all things as the products of intelligence, Anaxagoras constantly refers them to material causes. He, says Socrates, is like a man who would explain my presence here on the ground that "my body is made up of bones and muscles, and the bones are hard and have joints which divide them, and the muscles are elastic and cover the bones . . . ; and as the bones are lifted at the joints by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles, I am able to bend my limbs; and this is why I am sitting here." In all this, adds the philosopher, the physiologist "forgets to mention the *true* cause, which is that the Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought it *better and more right* to remain here and undergo my sentence. . . . Surely," he concludes, "there is a strange confusion of causes and conditions in all this." And there is; but is Socrates correct in thinking the latter or teleological explanation the *only* true explanation? In reality, both the physiologist and the philosopher are justified in their diverse methods of explanation; and we have summed up, indeed, in this passage the entire mechanism *vs.* teleology controversy which has troubled the history of philosophy since the time of Socrates until today.

The Cause-Purpose antithesis, then, is a justifiable one. Furthermore, it generates three other interesting distinctions, at which our quotation from Plato and our comments thereon have already hinted. First, we

have the distinction (f) between *Mechanism*—the theory that every phenomenon is the effect of some previous cause, and that the entire universe is a system of causes and effects; and *Finalism*—the theory that every phenomenon is a means toward the accomplishment of some end, and that the entire world-process is the expression of an intelligent purpose. Mechanists and naturalistic philosophers deny the legitimacy of teleological explanations altogether: vitalists and many idealistic philosophers, on the other hand, deny the universal applicability of the mechanistic type of explanation; but a synthesis of the two is quite admissible, recognizing the equal validity of both kinds of explanation, and that for a thorough understanding of any phenomenon both types of explanation must be applied. Accepting such a synthesis, we may add to our list of dichotomies under our present general head (g) that between *Science*, which employs the *causal* type of explanation alone, and is interested in *facts* for their own sake; and *Philosophy*, which is interested in *values* and *purposes*. Finally, within the field of philosophical theories, we have the division (h) between *Naturalism*, which rejects the above principle of distinction and denies teleology, regarding the concepts of science as ultimate; and *Idealism* in its broadest sense, which adopts this principle and concerns itself entirely with teleology, without necessarily rejecting mechanism (though many idealists do reject it) as a scientific concept (see Appendix A).<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Albee, *Philosophical Review*, vol. 18 (1909). Creighton, *ibid.*, vol. 26 (1917).

This brings us to the close of our extended consideration of the Phenomena-Noumena dichotomy and its diverse offspring. In concluding, it may not be amiss to plead for a revival of the use of the term which appears second in our dichotomy—not in the Kantian sense of a thing-in-itself intuited by a superhuman intelligence, but in a sense which benefits from the developments since Kant in the more recent distinctions between Fact and Value and between Mechanism and Teleology. By *phenomenon*, then, we may continue to mean what has always been meant by it—*viz.*, an object of actual or possible sensuous or introspective experience, a describable and causally explicable fact; by *noumenon* we mean any object which can not be perceived with the senses or introspectively observed or scientifically described, but which to be known and understood must be individually appreciated—*e.g.*, God, the human Soul, and the realm of spiritual Values. Every phenomenon, then, according to our suggested synthesis, may be explained in terms of other phenomena as causes, or may be interpreted as the expression of some Noumenon—as the fulfilment of a Purpose, the symbol of a Meaning, the instrument of some intelligent End.


10. *The Actual vs. the Ideal.* Closely related to the noumenal-phenomenal distinction is the dichotomy between the Actual and the Ideal, Facts and Standards, what Is and what Ought to Be. Life we know to be full of contradictions, and in times of trouble and perplexity the world of the Ideal seems far away from us;



but happily this is not always the case, and for most of us there are at least occasional moments of fruition when the Ideal seems to find complete if only transitory actualization. Not Reality, then, but Actuality is to be set over against Ideality; for Reality includes both, often severed, but not infrequently united.

Connecting this dichotomy with the immediately preceding one, we note certain interesting relationships: all Phenomena are, as such, Actual, all Noumena, as such, Ideal; but it is only when the Noumenon finds complete expression in the Phenomenon that we have such a union of the Actual and the Ideal. Ugliness, error, and moral evil, for example, exist too obviously in the world of phenomena—Actual, but far from Ideal; but in every beautiful flower, every noble action, every true proposition there is an actualization of the Ideal, a fulfilment of it in the phenomenal world. Hence—

TABLE II



Allied to this dichotomy we have (a) the familiar distinction between the *Descriptive Sciences* which are concerned with actual phenomena, and the *Normative Sciences* which have for their problem the determination of the means for actualizing or at least appreciating the ideal; and (b) the distinction in the world of art, literature, and the drama between *Realism* and



*Idealism.* The latter antithesis is a notoriously ambiguous one, and we have already met with two meanings for the second term—the doctrine that reality is of the nature of ideas (idea-ism), and the position that philosophy is concerned entirely with teleology (noumena). Only the latter can with any propriety (and even here questionably) be called idealism, and its true opposite is naturalism or pure mechanism. In the former sense of the term, the true opposite is realism—interpreting this as *res*-ism rather than real-ism (i.e., as the theory that reality is of the nature of things—*res*—rather than of ideas); and in the sense at present under consideration the true opposite would be *Actualism* rather than realism—the doctrine that the artist should concern himself with actual phenomena, “real life” (*sic*), rather than with ideals (see Appendix A).


## II

### Correlations

Having before us the various ways in which the world of reality may be dichotomized, there follows in our program the task of correlating these dichotomies.


1. The divisions we considered first were those of *Being* vs. *Becoming* and of *Substantive* vs. *Attributive* realities. According to the former, all realities are either Entities or Events: now, all Substances are Entities, but not all Entities are Substances—for example, Qualities and Relations are both attributive entities. The correlation, then, tabulates as follows:

TABLE III



2. Considering next the dichotomies of *Matter* vs. *Spirit*, *God* vs. *the World*, *Nature* vs. *Man*, and *Subject* vs. *Object*, we find certain interesting relationships. At once we may draw up the following table:

TABLE IV



But what of the Subject-Object distinction? A human personality, as distinguished from the Divine Personality, is Body (Matter) as well as Spirit; but it is only the spiritual or non-material side of personality which is a Subject-Object, Body (like the Things of Nature) being pure Object. What, then, is the place of Mind in the general scheme? Is it to be regarded as identical with Spirit? And what of Soul? Is it the same as Mind, or as Spirit?—or are Soul, Mind, and Spirit different in their respective connotations? The problem is turning out to be far more complex than it seemed to be at first glance.

I have already expressed the opinion that to identify any of these terms with any of the others, as is so commonly done, is a grievous error. I would now add to this previous statement my firm conviction that it is this confusion which is largely responsible for many of the most serious difficulties of the so-called Mind-Body problem. Psychophysical dualists insist that monism endangers the spiritual interests of man;<sup>10</sup> and this is a valid protest against the monism which confuses Spirit with Mind, and identifies this with the material Body. From the other side of the fence, psychophysical monists charge against dualism the difficulties incurred through its use of the causal concept to explain the apparent interaction between Mind (Spirit, Soul) and Body, if these are to be regarded as opposing Substances having no common Attributes; and this protest also is of considerable weight. Recognition of the dis-

<sup>10</sup> E.g., Pratt, J. B., *Matter and Spirit*.


tinctions which are here advocated, however, will obviate both these difficulties, and open the way for a reconciliation of the opposing schools.

At the outset, let us clear up our terminology. The true antithesis of Matter is not Mind, but Spirit; the true antithesis of Body is not Mind, but Soul; the true antithesis of Mind is not Body, but Brain. The fundamental dichotomy from the standpoint of the One (reality as a whole) is between Spirit and Matter; the same dichotomy from the standpoint of the Many (*i.e.*, the many Persons, since Things are pure Matter) is between Soul and Body—Soul the spiritual part of man's nature, Body the material part. But there is no evidence of Mind in man apart from Brain; hence, the true problem which splits the psychophysical monists and dualists is that of the Mind-Brain, rather than the Mind-Body, relation. All animals which possess brains presumably also possess consciousness; but in solving the Mind-Brain problem, the student of that problem may leave quite undetermined the problem of Soul and Body, or of Spirit *vs.* Matter.

Our concern, however, is a broader one than that of Mind and Brain, though including the latter. Let us, then, apply the categories of Subject and Object to our dichotomies. Only Spirit, including the Soul of man, is both Subject and Object; Matter, and its constituent Bodies, being pure Object. But, we repeat, what of Mind? Like Body, we reply, Mind is pure Object; but differs from Body in that the latter is an Object for many Subjects, whereas Mind is Object for its own

Subject only. From this standpoint we have, then, the following analysis of man's nature:

TABLE V



Psychology is the science of Mind, not of Soul, which has long been recognized to be the case; but equally emphatically not of Brain or nervous system, or of the Body and its behavior. The significance of the "psychology without a soul" development lies in the fact that only by so limiting itself to the Object-side of man's non-material nature can psychology become a science; but the underlying defect of the later and contemporary neo-realistic movement consists in its failure to recognize that man is a Subject as well as an Object—its neglect of the "I" in its over-concern to account for what we call "consciousness" in purely "objective" terms.

3. Let us next take into consideration the correlation of the *Substance-Attribute* and *Noumena-Phenomena* dichotomies with those we have just discussed. The category of Substance is undoubtedly one of the first importance. From the beginning of philosophical history down at least to the time of Kant, it has been re-

garded universally as the most fundamental of all categories. Substance is that which exists in and for itself, that in which Attributes inhere, ultimate as distinguished from dependent or derived reality. With Kant, however, is introduced the thought that the category of Substance (with the other categories) applies only within the field of *phenomenal* reality, and therefore is entirely inapplicable to the Soul; and with Hegel the teaching that the category of *Subject* is more fundamental than that of Substance, even though not *the* fundamental category. Accepting the Kantian lesson, we may say that Substance is indeed the fundamental *objective* category; but that it is *purely* a category of Objects, and so is not the most fundamental category of all, since it is not applicable to the Subject-aspect of Persons. The relation of a Subject to its Objects, in other words, is totally different from the relation of a Substance to its Attributes.

This conclusion reconciles materialism and spiritualism: Spirit (Subject-Object) is the only ultimately real Being, the noumenal source of all things; and yet Matter<sup>11</sup> is the only purely objective Substance. It also overcomes the respective difficulties of psychophysical dualism and psychophysical monism: Man is composed of two distinct elements, Soul and Body—a noumenal or spiritual Ego or Subject, with a phenomenal or material or substantial embodiment; and yet that part of

<sup>11</sup> *I.e.*, whatever Matter may turn out physically to be—Energy, Electricity, Ether, or what not. Philosophers are accustomed to use the term Matter for whatever it is that is known through the physical senses (*v.* Appendix B).



Body which we call Brain has a twofold function—as medium between the Soul and the outer world (*i.e.*, as governing organ of the nervous system), and as instrument for the Soul's own inner self-expression (*i.e.*, as “organ of consciousness”).

Mental and cerebral processes, then, are parallel phenomenal manifestations of the underlying noumenal Soul: they are, indeed, but two aspects of the same process—the former as manifestation of the Soul or Subject to itself alone, and the latter as medium of manifestation of the Soul to other Subjects. Mind is merely the system of mental phenomena as above described, the Brain in its “inner” aspect; but the Soul, which manifests itself through the Mind-Brain, belongs to the noumenal order, and is not a phenomenon at all. Body is a phenomenal Entity, Soul is a noumenal Entity; but Mind is not an Entity at all but a system of phenomenal Events (“mental processes”), having no reality apart from the Substance which we call Body. Again, as to the relation between consciousness and behavior, in its bearing on the Mind-Brain problem, our theory offers a comprehensive solution: the Body as a whole (Entity) with its behavior (Events) is the outward phenomenal manifestation of the Soul (*i.e.*, its manifestation to the world at large); but the Brain<sup>12</sup> rather than the whole Body is the physiological correlate of Mind, Cerebration the physiological correlate


<sup>12</sup> Or some special portion thereof, as the cerebral cortex; or the central nervous system as a whole—the determination of the precise correlate of Mind is a problem for physiological psychology, and we may ignore it here.

of Mentation.<sup>13</sup> Finally, both Mind and Brain are proper objects of scientific investigation (psychology and neurology respectively), and both mental and cerebral phenomena are explicable, each within its own sphere, in mechanistic terms—*i.e.*, there is no causal interaction between Mind and Brain, but there is cerebral causation and there is independent psychical causation, interpretable as two aspects of one causal series (psychocerebral parallelistic monism);<sup>14</sup> but Soul is not a proper object of scientific study, since its internal relations are teleological rather than mechanistic, the psychocerebral series being the instrument or expression, in the ways already defined, of the Soul's purposes. Thus, the double-aspect theory is applied to the Mind-Brain problem; but the relation between Soul and Mind-Brain is the relation of Noumenon to Phenomenon, or Ground to Expression, recognition of which should satisfy the objections of the dualists to the double-aspect theory. The more complete analysis of man's nature, then, (*cf.* section 2, *sup.*), tabulates as follows:

<sup>13</sup> This term for mental activity is preferable to the ambiguous term "consciousness," and by using it we evade the problem of the identity or non-identity of Mind and Consciousness. After all, the term "mind" is nothing more than an entification of what is really but a system of successive more or less complex processes or events (*i.e.*, an entification of "mentation").

<sup>14</sup> See my *Foundations of Psychology* (Princeton University Press, 1921), especially Chapter VI.

TABLE VI



*Explanation.* (1) The Self is both Subject and Object; but this statement has complete applicability only to the Self regarded as Noumenon (*i.e.*, the Soul), since the Body, or Phenomenal Self, is an Object only. Or, from the other side, the Self regarded as Subject is noumenal only, since to be a Phenomenon *is* to be an Object; but though all Phenomena are Objects, Phenomena are not the only Objects, for Noumena also may be known—hence, the Object-Self includes both the Soul (as Object known by itself) and the Body (which also the Soul knows).

(2) The actions, processes, or Events of the Self constitute its Behavior, including both Physical and Mental Behavior. The Brain is the part of the Body which the Soul uses as its instrument, and Cerebration is the (physical) Behavior of the Brain, whereby the Soul expresses itself to the world at large. Mentation or Mental Behavior, on the other hand, is the means whereby the Soul expresses itself to itself. According to the double-aspect theory, which we accept just so far, Mentation and Cerebration are ultimately one; but

the field of each may be investigated independently of the other, and in each such field causal interrelations subsist. Finally, the double-aspect theory does *not* apply to Soul and Body, which are distinct Entities, but rather an altogether unique relationship, *viz.*, the relation of Ground and Expression—*i.e.*, the Soul is the Ground of the Body, and the Body (including Mind-Brain) the Expression of the Soul's inner life. This view is *not dualism*, since the Soul-Body distinction is merely a specific instance of the Spirit-Matter distinction which pervades the universe, and Matter is everywhere the Expression of Spirit, apart from which it has no existence; but our view *does* acknowledge a fundamental *duality* in man's nature, as well as in the universe at large.

4. Complete consideration of the topic of our two preceding sections involves a brief discussion of the *Space-Time* problem. The fundamental character of both Space and Time may be summed up under the categories of Quantity and Order: the quantity-aspect of Space we call Extension, of Time, Duration; the order-aspect of Space we call Dimension, of Time, Succession. Physical Space, we say, has three dimensions, each dimension in itself including two directions, and every direction of the infinite number possible from any given point being definable by the coördination of the three dimensions; whereas extension in three dimensions measures the size and shapes of things, and extension in one dimension the distance between things or between points. The succession of moments in Time, on the contrary, has but one dimension, and one direction—from past, through present, to future; and duration consequently manifests only distance (“length of time”), and nothing that corresponds to spatial size and shape. We have, then, the following table:

TABLE VII

<i>Aspects of--</i>	<i>Space</i>	<i>Time</i>
<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Extension</i> <i>Distance</i> <i>Size</i> <i>Shape</i>	<i>Duration</i> ( <i>cf. Distance only</i> ) -----
<i>Order</i>	<i>Dimension (3)</i>  <i>Direction (6)</i>	<i>Succession</i> ( <i>cf. one Dimension only</i> ) ( <i>cf. one Direction only</i> )


Both the mathematical physics and the metaphysics of today, however, press the continuity of Space-Time, as opposed to the older view which emphasized the contrasts between them. Time-succession thus becomes a fourth dimension added to the three of Space. But a slight correction of this account seems to be called for in view of the fact that though all phenomena are in Time (*i.e.*, are Events), only physical phenomena are in Space also, mental phenomena being non-spatial. Time, then, is really the first dimension, to which Space adds three more. Thus, a "point-event," which is taken by the new metaphysics as the unit of Space-Time, is a one-dimensional Entity; and no "entity," strictly speaking, can be without dimension. This conception, furthermore, should have many advantages for those who are interested in problems concerning hyper-space.

Correlating these points with our former ones, we may regard Space as the "form" (in the Kantian sense) of Substances, and Time as the form of Events; but Noumena are beyond Space and Time. In other words, Time-Space is the form in which Subjects and other



Noumena phenomenalize themselves—Time the “dimension” in which all Events or processes “occur,” Space the additional dimensions in which material Things “exist.” Hence—

TABLE VIII




5. Our analyses up to this point have been restricted to *Individuals* and quasi-Individuals. We must now glance at the historic problem of *Universals*; though we shall here be concerned not so much with the question of their reality, as with their kinds and their relation to what is opposed to them. The usual antithesis has been between the Universal and the Individual, or between the Universal and the Particular: with Hegel, these are three moments of the Notion, and the Individual is the synthesis of the Universal and the Particular. The triangle on the blackboard, for example, may in the earlier view be regarded as an individual object, a particular representation of the universal triangle: to Hegel, it is the universal triangle particularized by virtue of its occupancy of a specific portion of Space. So for Aristotle, Matter (empty Space?) is the particularizing element, Form the Universal, and the actual Individual is the union of the two. Finally, for contemporary critical realism, Universals are Essences, and the Individual is a union of Essence and Existence: Existence, therefore, takes the place of Aristotelian Matter, as the particularizing principle.



One point stands out clearly throughout the history of this problem—namely, the indefiniteness of *Particulars* as contrasted with both *Individuals* and *Universals*. Every *Individual* and every *Universal* is a clear-cut distinct object of cognition; whereas *Particulars* are notoriously vague, ill-defined, and hazy in outline. Entities, then, it would seem, as distinguished from Events or Processes, are either *Individuals* or *Universals*, and *Particularity* is a more fitting characteristic of Events. What particularizes an Entity is its appearance at a definite moment of time, and fulfilling a definite function. If, finally, we recognize two classes of *Individuals*—*Persons* and *Things* (I, 7)—we may construct the following table:

TABLE IX



Every *Individual* is, therefore, a union of *Universal* and *Particular* in the sense that it is a distinctive combination of *Universals*, expressing themselves through a series of *Particular Events*. Each *Universal* in the combination is an *Attribute* of that *Individual*, and the combination as a whole constitutes its *Essence* in the sense of the critical realists: finally, it is the activity of the *Essence* in the series of particular *Events* which gives the *Individual* its *Existence*. For example, *bidimensionality*, *triangularity*, and *equilaterality* are *Universals*: each of these is also an *Attribute* of the *Indi-*

vidual triangle  $\triangle$ , and taken together they constitute the Essence of that triangle, its Individual Existence being constituted by its appearance in a definite place and at a particular series of moments in time.<sup>15</sup> Hence, the nature of the Individual may at this point be tabulated as follows:

TABLE X


<i>Individual</i>	
<i>Universal =</i>	<i>Particular =</i>
<i>Essence =</i>	<i>Existence =</i>
<i>System of</i>	<i>System of</i>
<i>Attributes</i>	<i>Events in</i>
	<i>Time-Space</i>

But our analysis is incomplete if we identify the Universal with the Essence alone. This would be an error as serious as that with which Socrates charged Anaxagoras in the passage from the *Phædo* already quoted. The Attributes of things (color, number, relations, etc.) can be described; but a complete understanding

<sup>15</sup> In Professor Whitehead's terminology (*v. The Principles of Natural Knowledge*, and *The Concept of Nature*), an Entity is any object of thought, and two kinds of entities are dwelt upon—Events, which pass, and Objects, which are permanent. What I perceive at any moment or series of moments is an Event in Time-Space: what I recognize as common to and persisting through such a series of moments is an Object, and every object lies entirely outside of Time and Space. Our own terminology reverses Professor Whitehead's use of the terms Entity and Object: to us, anything may be an Object, but we distinguish between Entities and Events as respectively that which *is* and that which the entity *does*. Furthermore, Professor Whitehead's "objects" are Universals, in the sense that we have just defined these—his "events" are Particulars, as ours also are; but we insist that every Individual "object" is a synthesis of these two aspects—the Universal beyond time and space, and the Particular "event" in time and space.

of any Individual involves also an estimation of its Value (its use, beauty, agreeableness, etc., or the reverse), which can not be described, but can only be appreciated. The combination of Values in any Individual constitutes the true Entelechy or perfecting principle which with Essence and Existence together make up the complete Individual. *Universals* ("Characters," we may call them) are, in other words, of *two kinds*—Essences or Attributes, and Entelechies or Values.<sup>16</sup> The complete analysis of the Individual, then, yields three factors—

TABLE XI




But even this analysis is complete only as regards Objects. We have already recognized two great classes of Individuals—Things and Persons. Things are Objects simply, but Persons are Subject-Objects. Our analysis, therefore, is complete only as regards Things and the Object-side of Persons. Every Individual Object is a Substance, or system of Attributes and Values phenomenalized in some particular Existence: every Individual Person is a Subject, objectified and phe-

<sup>16</sup> Universals may combine the two kinds, but in such cases analysis reveals the different elements. For example, readiness to meet danger is an Attribute which may or may not possess positive Value: courage is an ethically desirable form of readiness to meet danger, and so is at once an Attribute and a Value.


nomenalized in a Substance of the same general character as in the case of Things.

TABLE XII



6. We must now consider the place of *Ideals* in our general scheme. The contrast of the Actual and the Ideal (I, 10) is properly a contrast within the field of Universals: all Individuals are Actual, but Universals include Ideal as well as Actual Universals. Universals also, as we have just seen, include the two great classes of Attributes and Values; and Values in their turn include two classes—Factual (utility, agreeableness, etc.) and Ideal (beauty, goodness, etc.) Values.<sup>17</sup> Combining these two classifications, we have the following table:

TABLE XIII



<sup>17</sup> See my *System of Values*, *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 7, pp. 282-291 (1910).

Now actual Entities, according to our previous table, are of three kinds—Persons, Things, and Universals. Each of these is an *active* being, undergoing *processes*, since nothing *is* except so far as it *acts*. The Ideal, furthermore, is the Potential which “ought to be” Actual, and which when actualized produces the identity of “is” and “ought to be”: in other words, the Ideal is always a goal of action. For each Entity in its activity, then, there is a distinctive Ideal, and for each class of Entities a distinctive class of Ideals—*Beauty*, in the realm of material Things; the *Good*, in the realm of Persons; and *Truth*, in the realm of Universals. Things are never beautiful merely in themselves, but only in their activity—as, for example, in their action upon our physical senses; only personal Character, which is the organized system of a Person’s tendencies toward action, and Conduct, which is made up of the acts (behavior) of Persons, can be Good in the ethical sense; and Truth has to do, not with Universals in their static condition, but with Propositions, which are Universals in action. Hence—

TABLE XIV


Actual-----Ideal		
Entities-----Activities		
<i>Things</i>	<i>Impressions on the Sense-Organs</i>	<i>Beauty</i>
<i>Persons</i>	<i>Character and Conduct</i>	<i>The Good</i>
<i>Universals</i>	<i>Propositions</i>	<i>Truth</i>

7. *God*, in His correlation with the previously considered dichotomies, is an Entity, (a) purely Spiritual, and therefore above the Substance-Attribute distinc-

tion which applies only to material Things (including human Bodies); (b) purely Noumenal—Noumena including Spirits and Universals, and Spirits including Divine as well as human Spirits; (c) the supreme Individual; (d) the supreme Person, and therefore (e) Subject-Object. The *World*, on the other hand, includes Persons and Things, Spirit and Matter, Substances and their Attributes, Noumena and Phenomena, Individuals and Universals, Subject-Objects and pure Objects.

8. We have now completed our study of the correlations between the dichotomies of Part I, and are prepared to construct a table summing up all of them.

TABLE XV




*Explanation.* Entities include Noumena and Phenomena. Noumena include Spirits and Universals: Spirits include Divine and Human Spirits, or God and Man. Phenomena are Bodies, including Human and Sub-Human Bodies, or Man and physical Nature. Persons, including Divine and Human Persons, and Things together constitute Individuals, as distinguished from Universals. In the God-World dichotomy, the World includes Universals, Human Persons, and Things. Persons are Subject-Objects, but Universals and Things are Objects merely.



In this table we find all the dichotomies we have considered in their mutual relations, with the exception of the distinctions (a) between Entities and Events, (b) between Substance and Attribute, (c) between the One and the Many, and (d) between the Actual and the Ideal. Most of these omissions are made in order to avoid unduly complicating the table, but all the omitted dichotomies are allowed for in preceding pages.

(a) The table is by title a table of Entities. These include noumenal and phenomenal Entities as indicated, but phenomena include Events as well as phenomenal Entities (*cf. sup.*, 4). Phenomena, therefore, would classify as follows:

TABLE XVI



(b) The Substance-Attribute distinction, as we have seen (§3) applies only to the analysis of Bodies.

(c) The dichotomies which have concerned us have been entirely within the field of the Many, for by its nature the One can not be dichotomized and remain One.

(d) Finally, the dichotomy of the Actual and the Ideal has already been recognized (*sup.*, 6) as a division of Universals, and so needs no place in our general table.

### III

## Methods of Treating Dichotomies

Our third task as outlined in the introductory remarks is "to inquire into the various methods by which all false and inadequate diremptions of reality may be resolved." One criticism that might very well be proposed against our entire plan would be that any attempt to dichotomize reality is in itself condemnable—that reality is continuous, that there are no gaps or sharp distinctions in reality, etc. And yet, on the other side, it may be maintained that every distinction within the field of reality which has been made by any reputable school of philosophical thought has some justification and significance; and it is certainly true that most of the important divisions of philosophic schools have been due to conflicts in which one school has emphasized one side of a dichotomy and another school the opposing side. It may be worth while, then, to consider the question of how these conflicts arise, and what should be done about them.

1. *How Antitheses Arise.* The unreflective man's view of things is always quite simple and free from difficulties. As soon as reflection has shown this naïve view to be defective, the natural tendency is to reject it and to set up some quite different theory in place of it—usually one as far removed from the former as possible. Thus, the development of new philosophical schools usually takes the form of a *reaction* against the errors

of the earlier ones; and the consequence is that we find the philosophical world today replete with pairs of antithetical doctrines, some of which we have referred to in our previous analysis—Realism and Nominalism, Realism and Idealism, Monism and Pluralism, Monism and Dualism, Spiritualism and Materialism, Mechanism and Vitalism, etc. The naïve view, and theories allied to it, in any controversy may be denominated the *Thesis* (i.e., the original “position”), and symbolized by the letter “A”; the opposing theory then may be denominated the *Antithesis*, and symbolized by the expression, “Not A, but B”; and the first stage in the progress of any problem may be entitled, “the development of the Antithesis.”

The majority of philosophers and practically all non-philosophers accept this unhappy state of affairs with the utmost complacency. The joy of controversy thrills many a human mind, and the prospect of a peaceful solution of such controversies has not the same appeal. It is by no means only what the Reverend Clement F. Rogers calls<sup>18</sup> “the uneducated mind” that allows its thinking to be governed by the “Either-Or fallacy,” or, as I should prefer to call it, the Fallacy of Antithesis. It is probably in the field of religious controversy that the prevalence of this fallacy is most noticeable, apart from its presence in philosophy itself. “Should we believe on grounds of authority or of reason?”<sup>18</sup> Thesis (the naïve religious man) says, “Authority”; Antithesis (the sophisticated “man of intelligence”) replies,

<sup>18</sup> *Nineteenth Century and After*, November, 1923, pp. 728 ff.

"Not Authority, but Reason." "If a man is ill, should you pray for him or call for a doctor?"<sup>18</sup> we can almost *hear* the cynic cry, assuming without any further thought that to assert the value of the latter alternative renders the former act not only useless but ridiculous. "Christianity is not a creed, but a life," the Unitarian calls to the Episcopalian, thinking he has thereby disproved completely the value of creed *for* life. "Evolution or Genesis?" is a particularly popular cry today, with Fundamentalists on one side and Modernists on the other; and few indeed who are really interested in the question are clear-thinking enough to see the absurdity of the implied antithesis.

Mr. Claude Montefiore has given us a strikingly clear-cut example of this one-sided kind of thinking.<sup>19</sup> "Christianity is not," he assures us, "'Narrow is the gate,' etc., but it is, 'If anyone would come after Me, let him deny himself and follow Me.' It is not, 'Depart from Me ye cursed,' etc., but it is, 'Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of the least of these, ye did it unto Me.' It is not, 'Ye serpents, ye offspring of vipers,' but it is, 'Love your enemies.' So, too, with Judaism," continues the writer; and follows with another series of contrasted quotations from the Old Testament. In neither does he seem to realize that any religion which is worth its salt must have a severe side for the hardened sinner as well as a tender side for the repentant one. The Founder of Christianity is attacked by those who see only the latter side of His nature as a weakling and a

<sup>19</sup> *Hibbert Journal*, vol. 19, pp. 28 ff. (1920).

sentimentalist, and now comes Mr. Montefiore to criticize those sayings of His which reveal His strength and His powers of righteous indignation—neither seeming to realize for a moment that the Son of man came both to condemn and to console, and was not bound by the limitations of the rest of us who are not able to do both of these things.

2. *Methods of Solving Antitheses.* All this is a digression, perhaps, but I think a pertinent one. Let us, however, return to our main task, and having already considered briefly how conflicts arise, go on to inquire what should be done about them. Is the present state of affairs after all a desirable one? Even though we may enjoy controversy, and find it stimulating and up to a certain point meritorious, should we be satisfied with the *status quo*? I for one do not believe that we should be satisfied with it. The existence of an antithesis between two opposite views does not imply the real incompatibility of those two views, but rather calls for some kind of a *reconciliation* between them. The great need of the present time in philosophy is not the establishment of new systems, but the harmonization of those we have; and this task demands as strenuous thinking as any lover of controversy can wish for. The positive contributions of each school should be accepted for whatever value they may possess, in philosophical matters as they are in the sciences. But it is only, of course, through the difficult process of mutual understanding that this ideal can be realized, and in the spirit of St. Thomas Aquinas' too much neglected



saying that "if all men took the trouble to understand one another, they would, most of them at least [a concession to the wilfully perverse?], be of the same opinion."<sup>20</sup>

(a) *The Method of Compromise.* Two methods of attempting to solve antitheses must be distinguished—that of Compromise, and that of Reconciliation. The former of these always fails to bring about the desired result, and is but a pseudo-solution, but in many cases is the easiest and therefore most popular way out of the difficulty. It consists in finding some *middle ground* between the two extremes, and offering that as a substitute for both of the opposing views. How often, after hours of controversy between two persons or groups, do we hear some kind-hearted third person interject, as a supposedly final solvent of all difficulties, the sentiment, "Well, after all, the truth lies between the two extremes!" Now, very often in practical matters this is the only possible solution of the conflict. In industrial and international disputes, for example, it is not at all uncommon for a plan to be agreed upon in which each party yields a portion of his extreme claims, and a com-

<sup>20</sup> It may be objected that life would be far from ideal if everyone were of the same opinion about everything, and this is no doubt in a sense quite true. But there is little danger that this condition will ever be attained in this world, and all that is requisite is that the thinker should keep constantly before his mind the goal of the unity of all truth. After all, it is through "the strife of systems" that this unity is to be won. Each of us, finite beings that we are, will have his own peculiar and distinctive vision of the truth, and his own particular interests in the truth to emphasize, and this in itself will yield all the variety necessary to make life more than bearable for many ages of ages to come.



promise which brings the dispute to a conclusion is reached—a wage scale higher than that first insisted upon by the employer and lower than that first demanded by the employees, or a boundary line lying between those claimed respectively by the two contending nations, etc., is accepted by both parties. But in philosophical matters, a compromise between two opposing theories is rarely the true solution of the antithesis, and the acceptance of such a compromise is nothing more than an acknowledgment of failure to solve it at all. Not only does it leave the antithesis as sharply drawn as before, in no way softening the situation, but it has the additional defect that by accepting a compromise we run the risk of losing the really distinctive and valuable truths of each extreme. As a matter of fact, rarely, if ever, does the truth of any controversy lie in the middle ground between the extremes: on the contrary, in any worth-while controversy there is bound to be a great deal of valuable truth in each extreme which must be sacrificed if a compromise is to be accepted. The only real Reconciliation of an antithesis, then, involves a recognition of whatever elements of truth may lie in *either* of the extremes.

Following out our earlier symbolization, we may take as the motto of the method of Compromise the expression, “Neither A nor B, (but C)”; and of the method of Reconciliation, “Not only A, but also B.” If we run over our examples of the “fallacy of antithesis” quoted above, and almost any others of which we may happen to think, we may apply the suggested

principles, and I think will find in most cases that, in a general way at least, the true solution will lie along the lines indicated. The mystic, for example, tends to adopt the Compromise method as a way out of the controversy between authoritarian and rationalist: "Neither authority nor reason is the source of spiritual truth, but immediate ineffable experience." He is the true "radical empiricist," and like all radical empiricism his theory is an attempt to get out of a difficulty rather than to overcome it. I am not contending against mysticism as a *practice*, for as such I admire and extol it, but only against it as a final and complete theory of knowledge. To rely on mysticism alone is to expose oneself to the danger of fanaticism and superstition, as all the great practicing mystics have themselves recognized full well, just as to rely on one's sense alone is to subject oneself to possible illusions and other errors: in each case we need both authority and reason acting together to save us from these dangers. So the religious man of ordinary common sense does not seek for a "middle ground" between the practice of prayer and the practice of medicine, but when sickness threatens calls upon both God and the physician: he does not find his religion in some *via media* between creed and life, but in the intelligent practice of his creed *in* his daily life: he does not deny both science and the Bible in disgust with both, but sees clearly the distinction of viewpoint between them, the equal authority of each in its proper field, and the impossibility of any final conflict between them: he does not, finally, look for a

religion which is neither stern nor pitiful, but for one which knows when to be stern and when to be pitiful.

(b) *The Eclectic Method*. But the attempt to reconcile the Antithesis may take either of two forms—an *eclectic* form or a *synthetic* form. Eclecticism is any attempt to combine the positive contributions of the two theories just as they are—either by selecting what seems worthy and rejecting the remainder, or by apportioning the truth between the two antagonists. Its formula is, “Partly A and partly B,” or “A *plus* B.” This also is a favorite method in industrial and other practical disputes. If the labor union draws up a schedule of demands including higher wages and shorter hours, and the employer insists upon lower wages and longer hours, the expedient may finally be adopted of higher wages and longer hours, partially satisfying each contestant. So, in the Evolution-Genesis controversy, the eclectic may accept the theory of evolution so far as it applies to the inorganic, vegetable, and lower animal kingdoms, but reject the Darwinian view of the descent of man; or he may accept the first account of creation in the book of Genesis, and reject the account in the second chapter; or he may combine these two ways of apportioning the truth. In the matter of authority and reason, the eclectic may accept the authority of the first five centuries of the Church only, and rely on reason in his opinions regarding events since the Fourth General Council; or he may accept the authority of Luther or Calvin, but reject that of St. Athanasius and St. Thomas Aquinas. Or in cases of

sickness, he may be satisfied with prayer in the ordinary minor maladies of life, but forget to pray and rely purely on human science when severe illness threatens, only to return to religion as a last resort when death seems imminent and science can do no more.

Any attempt to solve a controversy by the eclectic method will be liable to three dangers or defects—inconsistency, false emphasis, and lack of unity. Each of the selected portions of the contending theories may be quite satisfactory in itself, and yet the various portions may be totally out of harmony with one another. Furthermore, without the help of a unitary guiding principle in reconciling the antitheses, the investigator is liable to emphasize the points in each theory which especially appeal to him, subordinating what may really be of more value for the final solution. Finally, as a result of the two dangers named above, any eclectic combination of opposing doctrines is an instable compound, and lacks the unity characteristic of a true synthesis.

For example, psychophysical dualism, which solves the spiritualism-materialism antithesis by dividing the world between two separate and distinct substances, thus substituting for the doctrines that "Reality is material only" and that "Reality is spiritual only," the teaching that "Reality is partly material and partly spiritual," ends by giving us two independent worlds instead of one, and making any real interaction between them impossible. And in a similar fashion a favorite solution of the mechanism-teleology controversy,

which gives inorganic nature to mechanical science, but insists that purpose rather than cause governs the behavior of organisms—or assigns the material world to science, but reserves the realm of mind for philosophy—is subject to the same criticism. No, cries the synthetist, Reality is all mind and all matter, all causal and all purposive, all scientific material and all philosophical material. Let us see what are the requirements and ideals of such a synthesis.

(c) *The Synthetic Method* of reconciliation consists in a critical study of the actual truths contained in each of the opposing theories, and a recognition of them as phases of the complete truth. Its ideal is the unity rather than merely the combination of two distinct theories. Its formula is, "Wholly A and wholly B"—"AB," not " $A + B$ ." Such a method is by no means exempt, of course, from the danger of falling into inconsistency, but with unity as the end kept constantly in view the investigator is put more definitely on his guard against this error than is the case with any of the former methods. In applying these principles, the synthetist settles the Evolution-Genesis controversy, for example, by accepting the evolutionary hypothesis throughout the entire realm of nature as a scientific doctrine, and the creation account in Genesis as a poetic presentation of the spiritual truth that the universe is dependent upon God for its existence—in other words, he accepts both evolution and creation as two phases of one truth, science and religion in general as concerned with different aspects of the same universe.




And similarly with the other religio-scientific antitheses: authority and reason, prayer and medicine, accompany one another as correlative criteria of truth and therapeutic practice respectively.

We may sum up our study of the various methods of treating dichotomies in the following table and diagram:

TABLE XVII

I. THESIS (naïve view): "A."
II. ANTITHESIS (reaction against naïve view): "Not A, but B." ("B.")
III. SOLUTIONS OF ANTITHESIS—
1. COMPROMISE: "Neither A nor B." ("C.")
2. RECONCILIATION: "Not only A, but also B."
a. Eclecticism: "Partly A and partly B." ("A+B.")
b. Synthesis: "Wholly A and wholly B." ("AB.")
ANTITHESIS
COMPROMISE
ECLECTICISM
SYNTHESIS



3. *Application of the Principles to the Dichotomies.* Let us now apply the foregoing principles to some of the more important dichotomies of Part I.

(a) *Being vs. Becoming.* The ancient Ionian philosophers assumed that Reality must be one static material Substance (Thesis = Being, the One, Matter). At first this is an "assumption," the "naïve view" of things, rather than a theory; but it develops into a formal tenet with the Eleatic school. The problem of Change



first appears in the controversy between Parmenides, who first (if we ignore Xenophanes) exalts Being as alone real (Thesis), and Heraclitus, to whom all is constant change (Antithesis = Becoming). The need of solving this antithesis leads to a second problem, that of Quantity, in which doubt is cast on the truth of the earlier assumption that the reality underlying phenomena must be one. This assumption becomes a definite theory with Zeno (Thesis = The One), and arouses the opposing theory of the pluralists, Empedocles and Anaxagoras, that reality is not One but Many (Antithesis), the Atomists representing the most radical development of this view. Through this concept of the Many the dichotomy of Being *vs.* Becoming finds an *eclectic* reconciliation, in the theory that change is due to a composition and dissolution of elements or atoms: Being resides in the Many, Becoming in the relations among the Many ("Partly Being and partly Becoming"). The only truly *synthetic* view, however, is that which regards Being and Becoming rather as coördinate phases of all reality: all things flow (Dynamism), but they are *things* just the same.

In recent philosophy the eclectic position is represented by F. C. S. Schiller in his *Riddles of the Sphinx*,<sup>21</sup> in which he offers the thought that the world-process is a passage from timeless non-Being through temporal Becoming to eternal Being; that Time, Change, and Becoming are but a stage on the way to a changeless and eternal state of perfect Being. This "perfect state,"

<sup>21</sup> Cf. the essay on "Activity and Substance" in his *Humanism*.

however, is not one of inactivity (which would be non-Being again), but of unceasing and unchanging activity. A synthetic view would gladly accept this interpretation of the Perfect State, but would prefer to regard Eternity as that which comprehends all Time, than either as the timeless (Antithesis) or as that which lies beyond time (Eclecticism).

(b) *The One and the Many*. Passing now to a consideration of the problem of Quantity, or of the One and the Many: we have noted how Thales and his immediate followers start with the assumption which under Parmenides and Zeno becomes the doctrine of absolute Monism (Thesis), and how the difficulty of accounting for change and motion led Empedocles and Anaxagoras and later the Atomists on to the opposing doctrine of extreme Pluralism (Antithesis). Modern philosophy offers a large variety of options on both sides of this dichotomy—on the one hand, the dual monism of Spinoza, the spiritual monism or pantheism of Bradley, the materialistic monism of Haeckel, the neutral monism of Bergson; and, on the other hand, the dualistic pluralism of Descartes and now of J. B. Pratt, spiritualistic pluralism or panpsychism, materialistic pluralism or atomism, neutral pluralism or neo-realism.

Between the two extremes, pluralistic personal idealism offers a *compromise* in its description of reality as a system of persons, rather than as a mere aggregate of independent elements on the one hand, or as single Person or Substance on the other: this is still a pluralism, but one of a moderate type leaning toward but not

quite approaching a real unity. But after all, the concept of a system can never be more than a halfway house between that of an aggregate and that of an undifferentiated unity: yet how are we to secure this unity without falling into the "block-universe" conception which destroys the reality of the parts? What we may call Plural Monism offers a true *synthesis* in distinguishing ultimate from derived reality: with monism it admits that reality is ultimately One, in that all else that exists owes its existence solely to this One; but with pluralism it insists as strongly on the distinct and unique, though derived, reality of every true individual, whereas all extreme monisms regard the Many as but modes, aspects, or appearances of the One. Theism, of course, is a form of plural monism, though a plural monist may not necessarily regard the One as personal as the theist does: theistic pluralistic "personal idealism," on the other hand, views God merely as the Ideal or Standard of the system, and not its Source (*e.g.*, Leibniz and Howison), and so is not an adequate synthesis of monism and pluralism. To plural monism, then, reality as a whole is describable as a system of entities, but as a system derived from a single Source.

## TABLE XVIII

### SOLUTIONS OF THE QUANTITATIVE PROBLEM

- I. *THESIS* = *Absolute Monism*: Reality is One.
- II. *ANTITHESIS* = *Extreme Pluralism*: Reality is Many.
- III. 1. *COMPROMISE* = *Personal Idealism*: Reality is a System of Many Units.
- 2b. *SYNTHESIS* = *Plural Monism*: Reality is ultimately One, secondarily Many.

(c) *Form* vs. *Matter*. Another assumption of the early Ionian philosophers, as we have seen (3a), is that all reality is material—both in the sense in which we distinguish Matter from Form, and also in that in which it is distinguished from Spirit. With Pythagoras we have apparently the first introduction of the concept of Form into philosophy: Number is the formal, rather than the material, principle of all things. This does not involve as yet a *conscious* dichotomy of Matter and Form, since probably even Pythagoras thought of numbers as material principles, but only that in point of fact the Milesians represent the Thesis (= Matter) and the Pythagoreans the Antithesis (= Form) of this distinction. With the earlier pre-Socratic pluralists the dichotomy becomes conscious: in the system of Empedocles the “four elements” or “roots of all things” are the material units and Love and Hate the formative principles, with Anaxagoras the homoiomeries are the material units and Mind the formative principle. Their systems, however, are eclectic dualisms, Form and Matter being given equal recognition, indeed, but being thought of as distinct sets of principles dividing the world between them. With Leucippus and Democritus we have a return to materialism, with Plato a revival of eclectic dualism, and it is not until Aristotle that a true synthesis is found.

In the Peripatetic philosophy, every actual created being is at once Matter and Form. The synthesis seems to break down at the two ends, but this is not really true of its *terminus a quo*: pure Matter is potential be-

ing merely, non-existent until infused with Form from above; and it is this infusion with Form which the theist calls creation—the bringing into actuality of that which without that act would be potential merely, and so non-existent. The definition of God as Pure Form, however, does seem to destroy the completeness of the synthesis: that He is Pure Actuality may be granted, but actuality is rather the union of Matter and Form than identical with Form alone. God, then, to be actual at all must contain an element of Matter—in the sense, that is to say, in which this term is opposed to Form. The Christian doctrine of the Trinity may accordingly be interpreted in terms of this analysis: God is “materially” One Substance, but Tri-Personal in “Form.”

(d) *Spirit* vs. *Matter*. The Ionian assumption that all reality is material in the sense in which this term is opposed to “spiritual” becomes an explicit theory (Thesis = Materialism) with the Atomists, and arouses as its Antithesis the Spiritualism of Plato and later of Plotinus. The first attempted solution of this antithesis is found in the theory of (psychophysical) Dualism, which regards *both* mind and matter as ultimately real and irreducible, hence representing an *eclectic* solution of the psychophysical problem. Contemporary Neutral Monism offers a *compromise* between Materialism and Mentalism in its doctrine that *neither* mind nor matter is ultimate, but that they are either developments of some neutral energy (the Bergsonian form of the theory), or combinations of neutral elements (Neo-Realism). A true *synthesis* can be found only in some



form of Dual Monism, which will recognize mind and matter as equally real but as reducible to unity. The chief difficulty which must be met in establishing such a synthesis is that of maintaining the balance between the mental and physical aspects of reality. Only the founder of dual monism, Spinoza, has fully succeeded in accomplishing this, all later forms either overemphasizing one or the other aspect (*e.g.*, Schelling, Haeckel), or else falling into agnosticism as to the nature of the ultimate reality (*e.g.*, Spencer). Spinoza's own system, however, is one-sided in its quantitative monism, and so fails as a thoroughly synthetic view of the universe.

The solution of the dilemma is to be found in a recognition of that distinction between spirit and mind, spiritualism and mentalism, on which we have already insisted (II, 2). Mentalism and Materialism are one-sided in making either mind or matter an objective noumenon, and subordinating the other to it as phenomenon: Dualism is defective in regarding mind and matter as distinct noumena: a thorough Dual Monism will recognize them as *coördinate objective phenomenal expressions of a spiritual noumenal reality which is itself Subject*. Such a doctrine is a Spiritualism, indeed, but overcomes the one-sidedness of both Mentalism and Materialism, and the defects of Dualism and Neutral Monism, while recognizing at the same time the *objective* character of both Mind and Matter, and the supremacy of Subject. Thus—



## TABLE XIX

## SOLUTIONS OF THE PSYCHOPHYSICAL PROBLEM

- I. *THESIS* = *Materialism*: Reality = Matter only. (Matter = Noumenon; Mind = Phenomenon.)
- II. *ANTITHESIS* = *Mentalism*: Reality = Mind only. (Mind = Noumenon; Matter = Phenomenon.)
- III. 1. *COMPROMISE* = *Neutral Monism*: Reality = neither Mind nor matter. (Mind and Matter = Phenomena only.)
- 2a. *ECLECTICISM* = *Dualism*: Reality = partly Mind and partly Matter (Mind + Matter). (Mind and Matter = distinct Noumena, irreducible to unity.)
- b. *SYNTHESIS* = *Dual Monism*: Reality = wholly Mind and wholly Matter (Mind-Matter). (Mind and Matter = Phenomena, reducible to noumenal unity.) *Spiritualism* = special form: Spirit (Subject) = Noumenon; Mind-Matter (Object) = Phenomenon.<sup>22</sup>

(e) *God and the World*. Theories of the nature of God are distinguished primarily according to the relation which they assume to subsist between God and the world. Pantheism and Deism represent the two extremes of Thesis and Antithesis—the former exaggerating the Immanence of God at the expense of His Transcendence, and ending in a complete identification of God and the world (Acosmism: *e.g.*, Spinoza); the latter exaggerating the Transcendence of God at the expense of His Immanence, and resulting in such a sharp

<sup>22</sup> Or Monism in its various forms may be taken as Thesis (no real distinction between mind and matter), Dualism as Antithesis (no unity between mind and matter), and Dual Monism as Synthesis (phenomenal distinction between mind and matter, but both reducible to noumenal unity). The primitive conception of the soul as flame, breath, shadow, etc., may be denominated Dual Materialism, and is a compromise between dualism and materialism.

dualism between God and the world as to render any vital relation between them impossible. The former doctrine we may designate Theocosmic Monism, the latter Theocosmic Dualism. Between these two extremes, all possible forms of *compromise* have been offered, ranging from the mildly dualistic anthropomorphism of popular religion to the monistically inclined World-Soul theory (Theëncosmism) of the ancients and of many moderns. Popular anthropomorphism exaggerates the Divine Transcendence, but retains the idea of interaction between God and the world: Theëncosmism makes God the indwelling Spirit of the universe, and so purely immanent, but (at least in some of its forms) admits the reality of finite personality and perhaps matter as distinct from God.


An approach to an *eclectic* theory is found in the Panentheism of Krause, which teaches that all things are in God, but that the Divine Reality extends beyond the confines of the psychophysical universe: God, therefore, is partly immanent (since if the world is entirely in God, God is found throughout the entire universe), and partly transcendent (*i.e.*, so far as God extends beyond the world); but the Personality of God is denied, and the doctrine therefore falls short of being a complete synthesis of Pantheism and Deism. Such a complete *synthesis* is found, however, in Theism, or Theocosmic Dual Monism, which regards God as wholly immanent in the world in His activity, and yet as wholly transcendent in His essence; combining the distinctness of God from the world which Pantheism, Panentheism, and Theëncosmism alike deny, and the inter-

action between God and the world denied by Deism; retaining Personality in God, but purging this idea of the taint of anthropomorphism.

## TABLE XX

## SOLUTIONS OF THE THEOCOSMIC PROBLEM

- I. *THESIS* = *Pantheism*: God = Immanent only, and identical with the universe.
- II. *ANTITHESIS* = *Deism*: God = Transcendent only, and unrelated to the universe.
- III. 1. *COMPROMISE* = i. *Theëncosmism*: God = Immanent only, but not identical with the universe.  
           ii. *Anthropomorphism*: God = Transcendent only, but related to the universe.
- 2a. *ECLECTICISM* = *Panentheism*: God = partly Immanent (so far as He is in the world) and partly Transcendent (so far as He extends beyond the world).
- b. *SYNTHESIS* = *Theism*: God = wholly Immanent (as active in the world) and wholly Transcendent (as essentially Personal).



*Explanation.* The figures represent Pantheism and Deism as at opposite extremes of thought, Theism as the complete synthesis of

these, and the other doctrines as intermediate between them. The letters signify as follows:

*a.* God as Transcendent.

*b.* { God as Immanent.  
World as indwelt by God.

*c.* World as distinct from God.

All three factors are essential to a synthetic view of God and the world in their mutual relations, as represented by Theism. Pantheism lacks both *a* and *c*; Theöcosmism lacks *a*, and Panentheism lacks *c*. But whereas Deism regards the world as originally created by God, but as having no longer any relations with Him; Anthropomorphism admits a continuous *interrelation* between them, substituting this for the doctrine of Immanence.

In the field of Christian theology, the doctrine of the Trinity is the *synthesis* of Polytheism (including Tritheism, as in certain phases of modern Hindu theology) and Unitarianism (including the Hebrew and Mohammedan conceptions). Trinitarianism is a Plural Monotheism, laying emphasis on the Unity of God as against all forms of polytheism, but insisting also on the inner complexity of the one Divine Nature. Monarchianism, as a transitional stage between polytheism and monotheism, teaching that there are many gods but that one of these is king or father of gods and men (*e.g.*, Zeus, Jupiter, Odin), is an *eclecticism* in that it accepts a plurality of gods, and combines with this the idea of one supreme deity, without actually reducing the plurality to a unity. Sabellianism or Modalism, on the other hand, which teaches that what are known as the Three "Persons" of the Godhead are not really persons but merely "modes" or manifestations of One Person, is a *compromise* between Unitarianism and Tritheism; as would be any theory which exaggerates the Triper-

sonality of God at the expense of His Unity, without absolutely denying the latter (a good deal of popular Trinitarianism falls under this condemnation).

Again, the Catholic and orthodox doctrine of the Person of Christ is distinctly and historically a synthetic doctrine. The Socinian, Unitarian, or "humanitarian" conception of Christ as "mere man," Divinely inspired prophet, etc., may be set as Thesis over against the Docetic and Apollinarian conceptions, which accept His Deity but reject His Humanity, as Antithesis. The Nestorian heresy, which distinguished a Divine and a human personality in Christ, and the Eutychean heresy, which taught that Christ's nature was a mixture of Divine and human, represent attempts to reconcile these opposed doctrines by the *eclectic* method; whereas Arianism, which made Christ a semi-divine but not absolutely Divine being, Monothelitism, which regarded Him as only partly human, and the older forms of Christian Unitarianism, represent *compromises* between the two.<sup>23</sup> The Catholic doctrine that Christ is "Very God and very Man," in two Natures but One Divine Person, is one of the most perfect examples in history of a complete *synthesis* of various positions.

<sup>23</sup> The theory of intermediary beings between God and the world—*e.g.*, the Logos and Powers of Philo, the Nous and Psyche of Plotinus—of which Arianism is the most famous Christian variety, is in every case an attempt to bridge an impassable chasm by the compromise method. The Catholic Church came to the only logical conclusion that if God and man are of different natures at all, the only way of "reconciling" them (synthetically, as we would say) is by means of some Being Who is at once God and Man. Modern Unitarianism, denying the premise stated, makes man himself divine, and



(f) *Nature* vs. *Man*. The chief difficulty with regard to the nature-man dichotomy is in avoiding the materialistic absorption of man into nature, ignoring the distinctions between man and the lower creation altogether, on the one hand; and the anti-scientific tendency to reject the evolutionary origin of the human species in the desire to exalt the human spirit over nature, on the other. Man, according to this view, must be either wholly and solely a divine creation, having no affinity with the beasts (Thesis); or wholly and solely a product of evolution, having no essential diversity from the beasts (Antithesis). This is the central issue in the Fundamentalist-Modernist dispute. Most of the popular theology which has not succumbed to contemporary "Fundamentalism" is *eclectic* in its willingness to admit the evolutionary origin of man's bodily nature, while insisting on the divine origin of the human soul; but in this it is teaching a psychophysical dualism which destroys the unity of the individual. Our previous analysis of human nature (II, 3), however, points the way toward a *synthetic* solution of the nature-man dichotomy, in its teaching that man is both wholly spiritual as noumenon and wholly psychophysical as phe-

so annihilates the problem of reconciling the dichotomy: earlier Unitarianism took the other horn of the dilemma, dwelling rather on the logical inconceivability of uniting in one being such diverse natures as Deity and humanity. From this standpoint, the former of these two varieties of Unitarianism represents the Thesis of no differentiation between God and man, the latter the Antithesis of no reconciliation between them: the Catholic doctrine synthesizes the two by accepting both the distinction between God and man, and their reconciliation in Christ the God-Man.



noumenon,<sup>24</sup> and that as such he is at once and wholly a product of evolution and a divine creation.

(g) *Subject* vs. *Object*. The importance of the Subject is a recent discovery in philosophy. Up to the time of Kant, the self is regarded as merely an object among objects, and the category of substance as applicable with equal adequacy to persons and to things. Hume's arguments against the existence of the self are the logical result of his failure and that of his predecessors and contemporaries to appreciate the significance of the subject-nature of that self, and his conclusion is on pre-Kantian principles convincing. With Kant for the first time we find a recognition of this primal truth that the Self is a Subject of thought, not merely an object, but only at the expense of neglecting the all but equally important truth that the self is an object as well as a subject; and we have as a consequence the theory of the Pure Ego or Pure Subject, which is as erroneous as the earlier doctrine of the self as mere object. In recent years the pendulum has swung back again, and once more we find the subject-nature of the self forgotten or denied. The two one-sided views of the self as object alone (Thesis) and as subject alone (Antithesis—"not object but subject") find reconciliation, however, in the complete conception of the Self as Subject-Object (Synthesis—"not only object, but also subject," "wholly subject and wholly object"); and the *eclectic* view of reality at large as made up of things or pure objects and selves or pure subjects is transcended in

<sup>24</sup> V. our treatment of the noumenon-phenomenon dichotomy, *inf.* (k).

the *synthetic* doctrine of the Absolute as Universal Subject-Object.

(h) *Substance and Attribute*. The first philosophers, as we have seen, taught that underlying the changing attributes of things there is an abiding Substance (Thesis), and this doctrine persists with little opposition down to the eighteenth century. The criticism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume led step by step to the complete denial of Substance, and the regarding of things as a mere aggregate, collection, or "bundle" of attributes (Antithesis). Locke's own view, of whose uniqueness he never seems to have had an inkling, is an *eclectic* dualism, substance being an "unknowable somewhat" set over against the attributes of things to hold them together. The *synthetic* view, which is after all but a modern refinement of the original one, regards Substance as the unity of the attributes.

(k) *Phenomenon vs. Noumenon*. The Kantian distinction of phenomenon *vs.* noumenon, and the consequent Ritschlian distinction between judgments of fact and judgments of value, are essentially *eclectic*; and the same may be said of Münsterberg's sharp antithesis between the mechanistic world of the sciences and the teleological world of metaphysics. To admit this, however, is not to deny the validity of the distinctions, but rather to admit it and therefore to continue dissatisfied with anything less than a complete synthesis.

The theory that all things are exactly what they are experienced to be ("radical" or "immediate" empiricism), that there is no distinction between phenomena and noumena, or rather that all phenomena *are* nou-

mena, we may take as Thesis ("Noumena are all"—Pannoumenism); the doctrine that all we can know are phenomena, or things as they appear to our consciousness, and that we can never know whether there are any things beyond phenomena or not (Phenomenalism—"Phenomena are all") becomes Antithesis; the theory that the "world of phenomena" and the "world of noumena" are distinct "worlds," that we know that there *are* noumena but can not know anything about them (Kantian and Spencerian agnosticism), is, as we have seen, an Eclecticism (Reality = Phenomena + Noumena); a true Synthesis must view the world of phenomena as a true manifestation to the senses and to introspection of the world of noumena—they constitute one "world," but every reality is *something more than* what appears, something more than "mere" phenomenon (Transcendentalism). The Roycean distinction between the world of description and the world of appreciation is such a synthesis, avoiding the extremes of Kant's and Münsterberg's eclectic dualisms.

So with the Fact-Value dichotomy. Before Ritschl, the distinction was not yet made—all is Fact (Thesis); the famous German theologian introduces his separation between science and religion on the basis of the Fact-Value opposition, and we have an eclectic dualism in this field as Antithesis. Those of us who reject Ritschlianism, however, yet realize the importance of the distinction, refuse to admit that "Values" are any the less real than "Facts"—rather, we insist, are they even more real. The distinction is not so much between valueless facts and *unreal* values, as between phe-

nomena or facts, which in themselves are valueless ("mere," "brute," facts), and noumena or value-realities. For science, facts are objects of interest for their own sake; but for religion, facts are of interest only so far as they reveal to us deeper underlying Values. Instead of identifying "fact" with "reality," then, and opposing to it "values" as "unreal," the *synthetic* view identifies ultimate reality with Values and derived reality with Facts, but views the latter as true manifestations of the world of Values or noumena.

(1) *Mechanism* vs. *Finalism*. The Cause-Purpose dichotomy, though an offshoot of the preceding one, deserves separate treatment because of its unusual importance. The antithetical theories are (1) *Mechanism*, the view that all phenomena without exception are the effects of previous causes, and that the universe at large is a system of causes and effects; and (2) *Finalism*, the doctrine that all phenomena are means toward the attainment of ends, and that the universe at large is a system of ends. Like other antitheses, this one is more apparent than real: to accept finalism does not involve the rejection of mechanism, unless the latter is defined to be the theory that phenomena are *fully accounted for* as effects of previous causes (extreme mechanism). In this case, the issue becomes a clear-cut one: Is the succession of natural phenomena directed blindly by mere mechanical laws, or it is directed intelligently toward some ultimate end? Is the course of the world's history a mere purposeless succession of causes and effects, or has it a purpose and a meaning? This constitutes what is commonly known as the *problem of tele-*

*ology*, and an acceptance of the second member of each pair of alternatives does not derogate from the truth of the mechanistic theory so far as the latter legitimately goes.

The usual solution of this problem, except by those who take the position of "extreme mechanism" as above defined, is an *eclectic* one—namely, that *part* of the world is controlled entirely by causal laws, and part by teleological principles. The dividing line is drawn at different points—between inorganic and organic nature (as with Kant in his third *Critique*), between infra-human nature and the world of human activity (as in the Cartesian philosophy), or between the material world and consciousness (as with William McDougall and H. Wildon Carr)—but in each case a sharp line is drawn somewhere. We hear it stated, for example, that whereas it is perfectly possible to explain the phenomena of inorganic nature in purely mechanical terms, vital phenomena do not lend themselves wholly to that type of explanation, but are determined in part at least by some special "vital force" or "entelechy" which is not mechanistic in character (neo-vitalism). Or it may be maintained that only material phenomena are explicable in causal terms, but that the appearance of consciousness introduces a new factor which is directed by the idea of purpose rather than of cause (neo-animism). Or, finally, one may admit that conscious or quasi-conscious phenomena in animals are subject to causal explanation while insisting that *self*-consciousness in man is super-causal (Cartesianism). But each of these divisions introduces an unreal dualism in our universe,



which is fatal both to science, whose causal interests will brook no limitation, and to philosophy, whose concern for teleology is quite as vital. Modern psychology (and I exclude behaviorism from this statement) has shown conclusively that even mental life is amenable to causal study, and philosophical investigation reveals as conclusively that even inorganic nature bears evidence of purpose (immanent tendencies toward ends, if not preëstablished external design).

The only truly *synthetic* solution of the problem of teleology is that which admits the *universal truth of both mechanism and finalism*—that all phenomena without exception are at the same time explicable in terms of causes (*i.e.*, of other phenomena) and interpretable in terms of ends (*i.e.*, of noumena). The mechanistic view of the world is essential for science, and the teleological view for philosophy, and the two are perfectly compatible with each other (*Cf.* I, 9). In other words, to paraphrase and at the same time transcend Leibniz (*Monadology* 79 and 87), the two kingdoms, that of causes and that of ends, that of nature and that of spirit, are not merely in harmony, but are one kingdom.

One word before leaving this problem. The philosophical controversy over teleology should not be confused, as it so easily may be and so frequently is, with the purely scientific controversy among contemporary biologists between the mechanists and the vitalists. This latter controversy must be settled by the biologists themselves, and philosophers have no right whatever to interfere in it. Both biological theories are perfectly



compatible with the broader philosophical mechanism. Biological mechanism holds that all vital phenomena are wholly explicable in physicochemical terms; vitalism, that vital phenomena are *not* wholly explicable in physicochemical terms, but are determined in part by some force or agent which is not physicochemical in constitution. The latter theory does not violate the broader philosophical mechanism, so long as this vital agent is recognized as being merely "additive"<sup>25</sup> to the physicochemical forces, and not contradictory of them: only when this vital agent is thought of as interfering with the natural causes ("extreme vitalism") is the theory in conflict with philosophical mechanism. In the former case, predictions may be made by applying a knowledge of the various kinds of causes; but in the view of extreme vitalism, the future is quite unpredictable.

To avoid this confusion it may be desirable to give up the term "mechanism" in philosophy and in general science altogether, leaving it to the biologists and to the physicochemists themselves, and to substitute for it in philosophical discussions some such term as "determinism." By this would be meant the view that all phenomena are rigidly *determined* by previous causes; and opposed to it we should have the theory of *indeterminism*—that *some* phenomena at least are *not* rigidly determined by causes. Both biological mechanism and "additive vitalism" are deterministic, and only "extreme vitalism" is indeterministic. The controversy between

<sup>25</sup> V. Marvin, *Philosophical Review*, November, 1918; and cf. article by Warren in same number.

scientific determinism and scientific indeterminism as thus defined is quite distinct from the controversy over teleology: either determinist or indeterminist may ad-

TABLE XXI

## SOLUTION OF THE CAUSE-PURPOSE DICHOTOMY

PROBLEM OF CAUSE	PROBLEM OF PURPOSE
<i>Deterministic</i> (All phenomena = de- termined by causes)	<i>Anti-Finalistic</i> (No phenomena = ex- pressions of purpose)
<i>Indeterministic</i> (Some phenomena at least = not determined by causes)	<i>Finalistic</i> (Some phenomena at least = expressions of purpose)
<i>Deterministic</i> (As above)	<i>Finalistic</i> (As above)
I. <i>THESIS</i> = <i>Extreme Mechanism</i> : All phenomena = fully accounted for as effects of previous causes ( <i>e.g.</i> , philosophical Naturalism).*	
II. <i>ANTITHESIS</i> = <i>Pure Finalism</i> : All phenomena = fully accounted for as means toward the attainment of ends ( <i>e.g.</i> , religious "Fundamentalism").	
III. 2a. <i>ECLECTICISM</i> = <i>Mechano-Finalistic Dualism</i> : Some phenomena = merely effects of previous causes; some phenomena = means toward the attainment of ends ( <i>e.g.</i> , extreme biological Vitalism; Neo-Animism in psychology).	
b. <i>SYNTHESIS</i> = <i>Teleodeterminism</i> : All phenomena = at the same time explicable in terms of causes, and interpretable in terms of ends.*	

\* Both Mechanism and "additive" Vitalism in biology are compatible with either of these philosophical positions—Extreme Mechanism or Teleodeterminism.

mit, or either may reject, purposes in nature. Our own synthetic doctrine is both deterministic and finalistic, and so may be denominated *Teleodeterminism*: naturalism in philosophy is deterministic but anti-finalistic; pre-scientific and anti-scientific religious philosophies (e.g., contemporary "fundamentalism") are finalistic but indeterministic ("pure finalism"); and the eclectic doctrines discussed above are indeterministic, but partly finalistic and partly anti-finalistic.

(m) *The Actual vs. the Ideal*. The distinction between the actual and the ideal calls for little comment in the present connection. Pessimism in ethical and religious philosophy and Naturalism in art and literature are forms of pure Actualism (Thesis)—Optimism and Idealism represent the opposite viewpoint (Antithesis); doctrines which set this present evil world over against some perfect heaven far off in space, this present degenerate time over against a past or future golden age, are *eclectic* in their treatment of the relation between good and evil in the universe; whereas a *synthetic* view sees the ideal shining through the actual at all points, and recognizes each to be a phase of the one great reality.

4. *Some Psychological Dichotomies*. As ontologists have always tended to dichotomize the universe, so have psychologists tended to bifurcate the mind. The most important of these psychological dichotomies may well be considered by us—although our primary purpose is ontological—as they afford useful illustrations of the

various methods which are occupying our thoughts in the current portion of this study.

Throughout the history of psychology there have been two leading methods of classifying the so-called mental faculties—(1) according to levels, into the sensitive and the rational faculties; and (2) according to function, into the active and the passive faculties. Among the Greeks, the former method alone obtained, the will or active faculty being regarded either, as by Plato, as a part of the “irrational soul”; or, as by Aristotle, as a special function of the “creative reason,” the lower “desires” being the active expression of the “sensitive” or animal soul. Later, there is a tendency toward a cross-classification of faculties, making use of both the above principles: thus, St. Augustine adopts the sensitive-intellectual dichotomy, but under each head further distinguishes three faculties, one of which is active and the other two passive—the active faculties being desire on the sensitive level, and will on the rational level. This type of division governs most of the Scholastic psychologists—St. Thomas, for example, distinguishing the sensitive and rational levels both on the cognitive side (the senses and the intellect), and on the appetitive side (the desires and the will). At this time, however, the emphasis begins to change, and the famous question of whether the intellect or the will holds the primacy in the mind takes first place. In modern philosophy, too, this becomes the predominant question among students of the mental faculties, and we may well begin our consideration of the methods of treatment with this problem.

(a) *The Intellect and the Will*. During the classic period in the history of philosophy, as we have just seen, activity is treated as merely one function of the sensitive and the rational parts of the soul, and the will has not yet made its appearance as a distinct faculty. The *name* we find, to be sure, but to the Greeks, "the will" is merely "the intellect active." This position is what later comes to be called *Intellectualism*, and constitutes the "Thesis" of our classification. It appears most emphatically in St. Thomas and the Dominican scholastics, dominates pre-Kantian modern philosophy, and is represented in post-Kantian philosophy notably by Hegel and Herbart. *Voluntarism*, which gives the primacy to the will (Antithesis), originates with St. Augustine, comes to the front with Duns Scotus, and becomes the distinctive teaching of the Franciscan scholastics: under the influence of Kant, who is more a voluntarist than anything else, it shines out in the philosophies of Fichte and Schopenhauer, and is the guiding star of twentieth-century Pragmatism.

Kant's voluntarism, however, is but one phase, albeit the dominant phase, of his total philosophy—the phase represented by his principle of "the primacy of the practical reason" in the second *Critique*. Judging his philosophy as a whole, we find three successive teachings on this point: (1) a sharp *Endopsychic Dualism*, as we may call it, between intellect and will, theoretical and practical reason, knowledge and faith, science and morality—intellect and will are coördinate and conflicting faculties; (2) a first attempt to overcome this conflict by his doctrine of the primacy of the practical



reason, or of the will over the intellect, according to which, in case of conflict between these two faculties, preference must be given to the demands of the will (= *Voluntarism*); (3) a second attempt to overcome, and this time to reconcile, the conflict between intellect and will through his doctrine of judgment in his third *Critique*—*feeling* is set forth as a third “faculty,” co-ordinate with intellect and will, and reconciling the conflict between them (= *Affectionism*). The first phase of the Kantian philosophy is really an *eclectic* combination of intellectualism and voluntarism; in some matters (*viz.*, knowledge of phenomena), intellect predominates—in others (*viz.*, practical affairs), will. In his second phase, he reverts to voluntarism as the fundamental doctrine of the human mind. Finally, in his third phase, he introduces another eclecticism, feeling being added as “judge” in the intellect-will controversy.

But affectionism as thus defined is by no means a modern doctrine, since it is the underlying principle of the psychology and epistemology of the *mystics* of all ages and of all religions. In epistemology, the theory is that of Intuitionism—that the highest and truest knowledge can never be attained by intellectual methods, but only by means of some “super-rational” mode of cognition of the general nature of feeling. When we come to consider the relation between feeling and the other two faculties, however, we find that two distinct varieties of affectionism have developed in modern philosophy: (1) the type represented by Kant in his third phase as above described, and followed to some

extent by Schelling, Lotze, and Emile Boutroux, which *adds* feeling to intellect and will, as a coördinate faculty or function of the mind; (2) the type brought into prominence by Henri Bergson, which *substitutes* feeling for intellect and will as the underlying principle of the mind, intellect and will themselves being regarded as later developments of this primal feeling. The former of these is an *eclectic* attempt to reconcile intellect and will by allowing feeling, intuition, or "judgment" to decide between them: Bergson's theory, on the other hand, is a *compromise* between intellectualism and voluntarism in its assertion that neither intellect nor will, but feeling, is the true organ of knowledge and basic factor of the mind.

The whole problem of primacy springs from two unproved and invalid assumptions: (1) that the mind is divisible into distinct "faculties," on the analogy of the organs of the body; and (2) that one of these "faculties" must be "primary" or original, and the others derived from it. A truly *synthetic* view of the mind sees in intellect, will, and feeling not independent mental "faculties," but coördinate functions of one self. Furthermore, neither one of these functions is to be regarded as "primary": rather are all three differentiations of one primal consciousness, which is itself neither intellect, will, nor feeling, in any sense in which these terms are used of the more fully developed mind. As a critical eye condemns the Comtean principle that religion, philosophy, and science follow one another chronologically in the order named, and insists that all three as we find them today are differentiations of a primal

curiosity concerning the universe and man's place therein; so it is with the functions of the mind—only gradually do the powers of thinking, feeling, and willing develop out of the primitive striving which knows not why it strives or whither, feels neither pleasure nor pain in its striving, and consequently can in no intelligible sense be said to “will” the end which it accomplishes.

## TABLE XXII

## THEORIES AS TO THE PRIMARY MENTAL FACULTY

- I. *THESIS* = *Intellectualism*: Intellect = primary, Will = derived.
- II. *ANTITHESIS* = *Voluntarism*: Will = primary, Intellect = derived.
- III. I. *COMPROMISE* = *Affectionism (Bergsonian form)*: Feeling = primary, Intellect and Will = derived.
  - 2a. *ECLECTICISM* = i. *Endopsychic Dualism*: Intellect and Will = coördinate and conflicting faculties: no reconciliation between them possible.
    - ii. *Affectionism (Kantian form)*: Intellect and Will = coördinate and conflicting faculties; Feeling = third coördinate, but reconciling, faculty.
  - b. *SYNTHESIS*: Intellect, Will, and Feeling = coördinate but derived functions of one self.

(b) *The Senses vs. the Intellect*. The opposition between the senses and the intellect, perception and conception, sense and reason, the sensitive and the rational “souls” or “faculties of the soul,” is the most ancient of all psychological and epistemological dichotomies. From the beginning, thinking men have observed that our senses often deceive us, and have inferred as unquestionable truth that only through reasoning can we arrive at a knowledge of reality. This theory, which

comes to be known as *Rationalism* (= Thesis), is first distinctly taught by the great rivals, Heraclitus and Parmenides, and is represented in its fulness first by Plato, who thereby initiates one of the most famous and insistent of all philosophical traditions. Between the times of Parmenides and Plato, however, appears the antithetical doctrine later known as *Sensationalism*, that the only knowledge possible to man is that which either the senses give, or which can be traced back ultimately to the senses (*e.g.*, Protagoras, Ænischidemos; Condillac, Hume; and in modified form, James and Bergson). Usually this theory ends in scepticism, and produces either a reaction toward rationalism or an attempt to reconcile the two opposing doctrines. Of such attempts, the most famous are those of Locke and of Kant. Locke's theory—moderate empiricism, as we may call it—is that there are two sources of knowledge, sensation and reflection, though what he means by the latter is by no means clear: this view we may regard as a *compromise* between sensationalism and rationalism—it is an empiricism, but not an extreme empiricism, leaning in its doctrine of reflection toward rationalism, but avoiding it, and like all compromises utterly failing to “reconcile” the two conflicting views. Kant's theory, on the other hand, is a sincere attempt to *reconcile* sensationalism and rationalism by combining the truths of each, and apportioning to each faculty its proper part in the construction of our knowledge: its weakness lies in its artificiality, and its method is that of *eclectic* combination rather than of synthesis. A true synthesis, as in the case of the intellect-will contro-

versy, must recognize the ultimate unity of the cognitive activity of the mind—that reason is a phase of experience, not something which can properly be opposed to experience; and elaboration of the data of sense-perception, not an inevitable antagonist of the latter. No such truly synthetic view of this problem is in the field today, regrettable as this circumstance must be acknowledged to be; but we can at least in this connection note in what direction the need lies, and gratefully recognize that the Kantian solution has gone farther in that direction than any other.

## TABLE XXIII

## SOLUTIONS OF THE SENSES-INTELLECT DICHOTOMY

- I. *THESIS* = *Rationalism*: All knowledge = product of intellect.
- II. *ANTITHESIS* = *Sensationalism*: All knowledge = product of senses.
- III. 1. *COMPROMISE* = *Moderate Empiricism*: Some knowledge = product of neither intellect nor senses, but of (*e.g.*) “reflection.”
- 2a. *ECLECTICISM* = *Kantian Criticism*: Some knowledge = product of intellect, and some = product of senses, each contributing a distinct factor.
- b. *SYNTHESIS*: All knowledge = product of intellect and senses together, each contributing a phase of the whole.

5. *The Epistemological Dichotomy*. Knowledge is a relation between the mind and the world of reality outside the mind. To the ordinary man, this is a relation between two distinct things—a Mind on the one hand, and a real Object independent of the mind on the other. Before leaving our study of dichotomies and the methods of treating them, therefore, it may be well to con-



sider this one, which is so fundamental to our understanding of the universe and our place in it. Although numerous other dichotomies arise in the course of any complete study of epistemological problems—such as the problems of the possibility of knowledge, its extent, sources (*v.* sense-intellect dichotomy, *sup.*), and methods—this which concerns the very *nature* of knowledge may rightly be adjudged *the* epistemological dichotomy *par excellence*, and our thoughts directed exclusively to it.

The naïve view of the knowledge-situation is that the object of knowledge is a non-mental reality, distinct from the mind, but known directly by the mind. The first clause expresses the position which we know as epistemological *Realism*; the second, epistemological *Dualism*; and the third, *Presentationism*: the whole constituting the doctrine known as Natural Realism (= Thesis), maintained, for example, by Thomas Reid. The antithetical doctrine is that usually attributed to Berkeley, and commonly known as Subjective Idealism, though this name and this interpretation of Berkeley are both open to criticism: that the object of knowledge is a mental reality (an idea in my mind), which I know directly, but which may be a copy of some external mental reality (*e.g.*, an Idea in the Divine Mind), which I therefore know indirectly. This is epistemological *Idealism*, because it regards the object of knowledge as mental in its nature; *Subjective*, because it regards the *direct* object of knowledge as something in my own mind; but a *moderate* subjectivism, because it does not restrict our knowledge to what goes on in our own

minds, but allows us to infer an external reality from our ideas, though insisting that this *indirect* object of knowledge is and can only be mental also. It is *monistic*, since it teaches that in knowledge the mind and its object are one; but it resembles its opposite, Natural Realism, in being *presentative* so far as the direct object of knowledge is concerned.

The suggestion that the idea in my mind may be a copy of that in God's Mind, however, is a reflection of, and at the same time an idealistic reaction against, the *eclectic* position of John Locke, commonly known as Representative Realism, which teaches that the object of Knowledge is a non-mental reality (Realism), distinct from the mind (Dualism), but known indirectly through an idea in the mind (Representationism). This theory partakes of *realism* in its insistence on the *non-mental* character of the *ultimate object* of knowledge—of *idealism* in its insistence on the *mental* character of the *direct object* of knowledge; agreeing with Reid on the former point, with Berkeley on the latter. It also partakes of *dualism* in its theory of the *ultimate object*—of *monism* in its theory of the *direct object*. Furthermore, its *representationism* applies only to our knowledge of the *ultimate object*, whereas the idea or *direct object* is thought of as being *presented*. Finally, Locke's eclecticism appears also in his distinction of primary and secondary qualities: Natural Realism puts all the qualities in the object, Subjective Idealism puts all the qualities in the mind, Representative Realism puts the primary qualities in the object and the secondary qualities in the mind.

The *compromise* view is represented historically by Phenomenalism, as taught, for example, by Hume—the doctrine that the object of knowledge is not reality at all, but appearance. Both Locke's and Berkeley's theories naturally lead to this conclusion; for if all we know directly is our own ideas, we have no guarantee that these ideas are copies of anything beyond our own minds: but whereas Locke and Berkeley agree that we *do* know reality, mental or non-mental as the case may be, Hume refuses to decide whether we can know it, and insists that all we can be sure of is impressions and ideas, and that we do not even know if there is any mind which "has" these impressions and ideas.

The Kantian doctrine is an *eclectic* combination of Phenomenalism and Realism: the object of knowledge is phenomenon, not reality—but we can and must infer that beyond the world of phenomena there is a world of real things. The Absolute Idealism which followed Kant is epistemologically a *compromise* between Subjective Idealism and Realism: the object of knowledge is a mental reality (Idealism), independent of the mind of the knower (Objectivism), but known directly (Presentationism), the human mind and its object (*viz.*, the Absolute Idea) being one in knowledge (Monism). This doctrine is idealistic, but an objective idealism, and so approaches the realistic theory of independence without quite attaining it. From the other side, we have contemporary Neo-Realism, which is a modification of Natural Realism holding that the object of knowledge is a non-mental reality (Realism), but one with the mind of the knower (Monism).

Of all theories of past and present, contemporary Critical Realism is the only one which offers a true *synthesis* of Idealism and Realism. The object of knowledge, it teaches, is a non-mental reality (Realism), distinct from the mind of the knower (Dualism), of which the "essence" is given (Presentationism). The doctrine is *not* that essence is given and existence inferred (Representationism), as if essence and existence were distinct factors of the object like Locke's primary and secondary qualities, or essence entirely in the mind ("idea") and existence entirely outside: rather, essence and existence are phases of one real object, which is as a whole independent of the knower, of which the essence-phase is presented to the mind, and the object as a whole (existence as well as essence) thereby known. Essence and existence *correspond* respectively to the "idea" of idealism and the "*res*" of realism; but instead of being set over against each other (as in Representative Realism), or one denied in favor of the other (as in Subjective Idealism and Natural Realism), or both denied (as in Phenomenalism), or a combination of the two made (as in Kant's doctrine), we have here a true synthesis in the recognition of them both as phases of one real and known object.

Furthermore, though itself an epistemologically dualistic theory, Critical Realism offers the only true *synthesis* in the philosophical field today between Dualism and Monism. Natural Realism is incorrigibly *dualistic* in teaching that the object of knowledge is wholly and in every possible sense distinct from the mind of the knower: both Subjective Idealism and Neo-Realism

are radically *monistic* in teaching that the object of knowledge is absolutely one with the mind of the knower: Absolute Idealism is a *compromise* theory, in that the ideas of the Absolute Mind, which the finite mind knows, are beyond those of the finite knower, and yet not entirely distinct from them, as in representative idealism: Representationism in both its realistic and its idealistic forms is *eclectic* in teaching that the direct object of knowledge is in the mind of the knower, and the ultimate object beyond it—the object is partly one

## TABLE XXIV

## SOLUTIONS OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DICHOTOMY

- I. *THESIS* = *Natural Realism*: The object of knowledge = a non-mental reality distinct from the mind of the knower, but presented to it (e.g., Reid).
- II. *ANTITHESIS* = *Subjective Idealism*: The object of knowledge = a mental reality in the mind of the knower (e.g., Berkeley ?).
- III. 1. *COMPROMISE* = *i. Phenomenalism*: The object of knowledge = not reality, but appearance (e.g., Hume).
  - ii. Absolute Idealism*: The object of knowledge = a mental reality beyond the mind of the knower, but presented to it.
  - iii. Neo-Realism*: The object of knowledge = a non-mental reality, but one with the mind of the knower.
- 2a. *ECLECTICISM* = *i. Representative Realism*: The object of knowledge = a non-mental reality, distinct from the mind of the knower, but represented in the mind by an idea (e.g., Locke).
  - ii. Kantian Criticism*: The object of knowledge = not reality, but appearance; but there is a non-mental reality.
- b. *SYNTHESIS* = *Critical Realism*: The object of knowledge = a non-mental reality, distinct from the mind of the knower, but presented to it *in essence*.



with, and partly distinct from, the mind: Critical Realism makes the object in one sense (*viz.*, in its existence) wholly distinct from the mind of the knower, and in another sense (*viz.*, as essence) wholly one with it.

6. *Conclusion of Part III.* Summing up, we may observe in conclusion that any system of philosophy which claims to be synthetic must allow for both sides of each possible dichotomy—Being and Becoming, Substance and Attribute, Form and Matter, One and Many, Spirit and Matter, God and the World, Nature and Man, Subject and Object, Phenomenon and Noumenon, Actual and Ideal, Intellect and Will, Sense and Reason, Idea and Thing. If we examine the systems of the great philosophers of history and of the present day, we can not fail to observe how far each of them falls short of this requirement. The greatest of them stand out as advocates of one or the other side of some important dichotomy—or, to use Professor Whitehead's now popular term, bifurcation—of the universe of Being. In our study of the dichotomies, we have noticed how this is the case. By the nature of things, each philosopher gets his glimpse of the universe from his own particular and inevitably limited standpoint, and it is only through an effort of imagination beyond the reach of most minds that one is able to appreciate the complementary points of view, and to discover the means for synthesizing them.

After all, with all its defects, no system of philosophy in the field today has come nearer to a truly synthetic

view of the great problems of reality than that of Josiah Royce. The One and the Many, "the World and the Individual," both find their place in a metaphysical system which synthetizes the pluralism of James with the monism of Bradley: the statism of Plato and Spinoza is united with and vitalized by the dynamism of Aristotle and Bergson: the reality of Nature is profoundly acknowledged, as an expression of the supremacy of Spirit: the intellectualism of Hegel and the voluntarism of Schopenhauer find in the synthetic philosophy of Royce their equal justification and their complete reconciliation. Contemporary critical realism, which I have commended as the most synthetic of epistemological theories, is a post-Roycean development, but one which is perfectly compatible with Royce's own theory of the internal and external meanings of ideas, and with the general *metaphysics* of absolute idealism. Epistemologically, absolute idealism is defective, as I have tried to show above; but if the "existence" of things is psychical, as C. A. Strong teaches (though I do not accept his latest interpretations), we may develop from this a spiritualistic metaphysics which will synthetize idealism and realism in a striking and thoroughly satisfying way.

We have now completed our discussion of the methods of treating dichotomies, but before leaving it entirely a word or two to guard against a misunderstanding of our position must be added. In the first place, we do not naïvely pretend that the synthetic method is a panacea for all philosophical difficulties. It may well be that in some particular problem the truth lies at one

or the other of the extremes, or somewhere between the extremes, or in some combination of them—or even that all extant suggestions of solution are on the wrong track. Usually, however, a synthetic solution is what is most needed; and, as a general principle, certainly truth *is* a synthesis of opposites rather than a combination of parts of opposites or a compromise between them.

Our second point is that merely to *say* that the truth regarding any problem consists in a synthesis of opposite solutions is by no means to solve the problem in question. The chief difficulty here, as in practical affairs, may be to find out what *is* the synthetic solution. This was strikingly exemplified in our discussion of the problem of the sources of knowledge (4b), where we saw that the Kantian solution, though the nearest approach to a synthetic one that we have, is in itself merely an eclectic combination of sensationalism and rationalism, and that the true synthesis is yet to seek. All that can be justly claimed for the synthetic method is that it is the most promising of all methods for attacking philosophical problems, and deserves greater attention than it has heretofore received; but the application of the methods must be left to the individual philosopher, and adapted to the individual case.

## IV

# The Modalities of Being and Their Opposites

Our essay is entitled a study of the dichotomies and modalities of Being. Having now completed our examination of the former, we have for our next task a consideration of those "allied concepts to that of Being" which I have denominated "modalities" thereof. By modalities of Being I mean analogous concepts to that of Being which are by some philosophers distinguished from but subordinated to the latter, and by some identified with it. Four such analogous concepts will call for our consideration—*viz.*, Reality, Actuality, Existence, and Subsistence; and in considering them we shall find it useful to contrast them to their various opposites or "others"—Unreality, Ideality, Non-Existence, etc. Some philosophers identify these modalities, so that to say that A *is* implies that it *exists*, is *real*, and is *actual*: others subordinate the three latter to the former, so that, for example, to say that A *exists* implies that it *is* or *has Being*, but not the converse.

1. *Being*. All philosophers seem to be at one in taking Being as the *summum genus* of all concepts, whether the others are treated as species of this *summum genus* or as identical with it. Whatever can be thought, spoken of, or written of at least *is* or *has being*, as the phrase goes: this is as true of golden mountains, winged

horses, and the gods of Olympus as it is of triangles, red houses, and the God of Christendom; it is as true of the French Revolution and the Presidential election of 1936 as it is of the events recorded in today's evening newspaper.

Three meanings of Being or "is" must be distinguished, however: (a) the concept as used in the preceding paragraph, having for its opposite *Non-Being*. If everything that can be thought, spoken of, or written of has being, can there be any content to the concept Non-Being? If everything *is*, can anything *not be*? Well, for one thing, round squares *are not*, in any sense of that expression. One may speak or write the words, but he can not *think* them, nor do the words which he writes *mean* anything—*i.e.*, they do not express any *concept*. The same is true of such quasi-concepts as white blackness, golden iron, aerial submarines, etc., in any literal significance which these contradictory pairs of words may presume to have—each belongs wholly to the realm of Non-Being. White may shine through the blackness, iron may be painted to look like gold, a plane which may fly through the air or submerge under the water at the will of its commander may some day be invented; but the blackness itself *is not* in any sense white, the iron golden, or the submarine aerial.


(b) In an already familiar and narrower sense of the term, we find Being opposed to *Becoming*. As one of the most important dichotomies of the universe is into Being and Becoming, and has already been fully discussed (I, 1; II, 1; III, 3a), there is no occasion to dwell upon it further, except to explain its relations to



the other uses of the concept Being. Becoming also *is*—*i.e.*, is a fact, is a truth: in other words, Being (in the narrower sense) and Becoming, Entities and Events, are species of the *summum genus* Being or Beings. Things are, and things become; and both these statements are expressions of truths which *are*, or have Being in the broader sense of this term. I *am*, for example, and my life is “going on,” *becoming*, now; but both what I am and what I am doing *are*. To avoid confusion, this second use of the term Being may be designated “Persistent Being.”

(c) In a still narrower sense, within the realm of Becoming a further distinction is made between what *is now* (Present Being), and what *is not now* but “was” or “is to be.” To say, “Enoch is not” means that he has no earthly being now, but does not deny that at some previous time he “was” in the earthly sense. Becoming, in other words, involves distinctions of time; and in this sense what *is* is opposed on the one hand to what *was*, and on the other hand to what *will be*—and both what “was” and what “will be” *are not*, in this restricted sense of that expression. In this third sense of the term, the administration of Calvin Coolidge *is*, the French Revolution *is not*; though in the first sense of the term both *are*, and in the second sense neither “is,” but “goes on” or *becomes*. Hence—

TABLE XXV



2. *Reality* is perhaps the most ambiguous of all the concepts with which we are at present concerned, both in technical and popular usage. Here again three general meanings may be distinguished—(a) Reality as opposed to Appearance (Phenomenon), (b) Reality as opposed to Imagination (Fact *vs.* Fancy or Fiction), and (c) Reality as opposed to Unreality.

(a) The distinction between Reality (“Underlying Reality”) and *Appearance* (Phenomenon) is one of the most famous in all philosophy, and at the same time one of the most difficult to define. Very early in the life of the individual the discovery is made that things are not always what they seem to be, and in many instances further reflection leads to the conclusion that things are never in reality what they appear to be. In this case we have a sharp distinction between Reality and Appearance: what is real does not appear, and what appears is not real. Bradley’s doctrine is of this type, and seems in every way virtually to identify Appearance with Unreality. The Kantian distinction is not quite so extreme, but is of the same general character: things as they are in themselves are not as they appear to us; but phenomena are not for this reason unreal. A still milder view of this contrast would make Appearance the *expression* of Reality to our consciousness, a *phase* or partial view of Reality: things *are* as they appear, only more so, as it were. In knowing Appearance, then, we know Reality, though only in part. Finally, radical empiricism teaches that the contrast does not exist: what appears is real *as* it appears, Reality is nothing beyond Appearance.

Disregarding specific metaphysical theories, the third distinction is undoubtedly the most rational on purely logical grounds—and our present purpose is primarily logical. What is real, appears: what appears is the appearance of some type, at least, of Reality. Whether yonder red house is “really red” in any metaphysical sense does not concern us: the realist would say it is, the idealist *may* say it is not. At least, it *appears to be* red, and behind (or identical with) that appearance, therefore, there is *something* real which manifests itself to us through (or in) that appearance. Appearance, then, is Reality as we know or perceive it: Reality (in this sense) is that which appears. The redness of the house is an Appearance: it may or may not be Reality, but it at least expresses Reality to us, and so is *not unreal*.<sup>26</sup>

(b) The contrast between the Real and *the Imaginary*, Fact and Fancy or Fiction,<sup>27</sup> is also a familiar one; and as in the former case, to draw this contrast does not imply a denial of the reality of Fancy in the sense that the imaginary is identical with the unreal. To many persons, Colonel Newcome is far more real than the President of the French Republic, the Richard

<sup>26</sup> A distinction analogous to this one is that commonly drawn between the real in the sense of what is *genuine*, and the *spurious*. “Real” or genuine pearls, for example, are distinguished from those which are artificial imitations and as such condemned as “not real.” The former we say *are* what they *appear* to be: the latter are *not* what they appear to be.

<sup>27</sup> This must not be confused with the Fact-Value distinction already considered (I, 9a, II, 6; *v.* also *inf.*, 3b). Values may be real or imaginary.

III of Shakespeare's play than the Richard III of history; and yet both these characters are products of man's imagination, fictions rather than facts. On the other hand, many who would call Colonel Newcome a reality, would insist that the hallucinations of the insane, and even the dreams of the healthy-minded, are "purely imaginary" and not real in any sense; and yet I may relate my dreams in as vivid a style as that of Thackeray, or the lunatic his hallucinations as graphically as Shakespeare his characters, without altering the judgment of the critic.

The solution of the paradox lies, of course, in the recognition of the truth both of the distinction between Fact and Fiction, and also of the distinction between the Real as opposed to the Unreal, and the Real ("Objective Reality") as opposed to the Imaginary. In the latter sense, with which we are at present most concerned, the Real (Fact) is that which is *independent* in its origin of the mind or minds of any one man or limited group of men, the Imaginary is that which is *dependent* for its origin upon the mind or minds of some one man or limited group of men. When the latter is said to be "more real" than the former (*e.g.*, Colonel Newcome more real than the President of the French Republic), what is meant is that it has made a deeper impression than the other on the minds of the speaker and those with whom he is associated (*i.e.*, in this case, the readers of English fiction). In other words, imagination is the test of the reality of the imaginary, just as reasoning is the test of the reality of fact. And when the same critic denies the reality of my

dreams or the lunatic's hallucinations, it is because the lunatic and I have not succeeded in interesting him so well as Thackeray and Shakespeare have done. Both Facts and Fictions, then, are, or may be, real in the third (following) sense of this term.

Analogous to this distinction is that which subsists between "an *original*" of any kind and its various *copies* or representations. A portrait or statue is, like a reflection in a mirror or an image in the mind of some second person, a copy or representation of the individual whom we call its "original." And so it is with a copy of an original manuscript. In many individual instances this distinction corresponds to that already drawn (2a, note 26) between the genuine and the spurious, but this is by no means always the case. We may speak of an "original" manuscript as being "genuine" as set over against its copies; but only if the latter *claim* to be genuine do we call them "spurious." But when we speak of the "original" of a photograph or painting we do not thereby deny the "genuineness" of the copy, but merely assert the purely secondary or representative character of its "reality."

(c) The true contradictory of Reality is not Appearance or Fancy but *Unreality*. As in the case of the first contrast, this distinction is drawn at different points by the advocates of different metaphysical systems, but for our purely logical purposes we may define the Real in this sense as that which *exerts influence*, and assert that any Being is real just so far as, and in the sphere in which, it does exert influence. This definition assumes the truth of the doctrine of degrees and realms



of Reality, since it is impossible to give any definition of Reality in this third sense and deny the truth of that doctrine, unless we take the extreme position that only the Absolute or the One is real in any sense. We may say that only the Absolute has complete and ultimate Reality, and that all other reality is derived from and relative to the Absolute; but some degree or type of Reality all Beings must have, and only Non-Being is completely and ultimately unreal.

My dream, then, though *imaginary*, may be *as real to me* as the interior of the Elysée palace is to the President of the French Republic; and yet is *unreal* to anyone but myself so long as it has no influence upon the mind of anyone else. Colonel Newcome, on the other hand, though *imaginary*, is real in a far more complete sense than my dream, because he lives in the minds of many individuals although his creator no longer dwells among us.

(d) *Correlations*. Looking back from the point we have now reached, we may say that Reality in the third sense is identical with Being—whatever *is*, is *real* in some degree at least; but in the first and second senses, Being includes both Reality and its opposite—Appearances *are*, and are *real* in the third sense of this term, though not in the first: Fictions *are*, and are *real* in the third sense, though not in the second. Furthermore, comparing the first and second usages of the term, we observe that Facts may be real (*e.g.*, the straightness of this stick) or apparent (*e.g.*, the bentness of the same stick when partially submerged in water); but that all Fictions (*e.g.*, Colonel Newcome, my dream)

are by their very nature apparent. In other words, what is real in the first sense (as opposed to Appearance) must be also real in the second sense (Fact, as opposed to Fiction); but Appearance includes both Facts and Fictions.

Finally, both "Persistent" Being and Becoming are real in the third sense of the latter term, but all Becoming (*i.e.*, every Event) is an appearance of some real Entity. Becoming (like Being) may be real in the second sense (*e.g.*, the French Revolution) or imaginary (*e.g.*, Romeo's wooing of Juliet).

TABLE XXVI

## CORRELATIONS OF REALITY AND BEING

<i>Reality (c) = Being (a)-----Unreality*Non Being</i>	
<i>Reality (a)-----Appearance</i>	
<i>Reality (b)-----Imagination</i>	
<i>(Facts)</i>	<i>(Fictions or Fancies)</i>
<i>Being (b)-----Becoming</i>	
<i>(Entities)</i>	<i>(Events)</i>

3. *Actuality*, the third modality of Being to be considered, is by most philosophers acknowledged not to be identical with Being itself. To assert that A is *actual* certainly implies more than merely to assert that A *is*, or even that A is *real*. The important distinctions are two—(a) the Actual ("Complete Actuality") as distinguished from the Possible or from the Potential, and (b) the Actual ("Mere Actuality") as distinguished from the Ideal; and in each of these cases the second member of the pair has also another opposite distinct from

the first—*viz.*, (a) the Impossible and (b) the Unideal. In this, Actuality differs from the two previously considered concepts: the opposites of Becoming, Appearance, and Imagination are simply Being, Reality (a) and Reality (b), respectively. In other words, Actuality and Possibility, the Actual and the Ideal, are not strictly speaking contradictories, or even opposites, since the same Being may be at once actual and possible, actual and ideal.

(a) The distinction between Actuality and *Potentiality* is almost as ancient as that between Being and Becoming, constituting as it does one of the foundation stones of the system of Aristotle (*cf.* I, 3b; II, 6). Since his time, so much has been written on the subject of Potentiality that little need be added here. The Actual is that which *is*—not as distinguished from what is not, from what was or will be, or from what becomes, but from what *may be*. What may be, we call *Possible*: what may be, and under normal conditions will be, we call *Potential*. An acorn is a potential oak, a child a potential man, to use the classic illustrations; but though every child is a *possible* criminal, only a child of bad heredity and training can properly be called a *potential* one. This distinction between possible and potential, however, is one merely of degree, and may be ignored for ordinary purposes.

When time-distinctions are taken into consideration, we say, what *is actual* now, *was potential*: what *is potential* now, probably *will be actual*. For example, the American Constitution was potential in the conditions preceding the Revolutionary War, the result of


the Presidential election of 1928 is potential in the events of the present administration; but the present administration is an actual reality today, whereas the results of the next Presidential election will not be actual until 1929—they are a future actuality, but a present potentiality.

But there is another distinction between Possibility and Potentiality which must not be neglected. Actuality and Potentiality are true contradictories within the universe of Reality: if A is real, it is either actual or potential, but can not be both at the same time and in the same sense. The situation regarding Possibility is different: if A is actual, it is therefore possible. Actuality, then, implies simultaneous Possibility, though the converse is not true: on the other hand, Actuality implies past (not simultaneous) Potentiality, and Potentiality implies future Actuality.

Furthermore, Possibility is distinguished not only from Actuality, but also from *Necessity* on the one hand and *Impossibility* on the other, those constituting therefore four degrees of “modality” in the restricted use of this term as employed by Kant and formal logic—Impossibility, Possibility, Mere Actuality (Contingency), Necessity. Of these, Possibility and Impossibility are true contradictories: Contingency and Necessity are true contradictories within the realm of the Actual. Hence, A, if it *is* at all, is either possible or impossible; if possible, it is either actual or not actual; if actual, it is either contingent or necessary. But the Impossible extends beyond Reality and Being into the realm of Non-Being. A golden mountain, for example,

though an impossible fiction, has Being in that it is not self-contradictory: a round square, on the contrary, is unreal, impossible, non-being.

TABLE XXVII



(b) In its second meaning, the Actual is contrasted to the *Ideal*—what *is* to what *ought to be*. This distinction also we have met with before (I, 10; II, 6; III, 3m), and it has already been quite fully discussed. The Actual and the Ideal are both Real; and they are not contradictories, since it is quite possible for any Reality A to be at the same time actual and ideal. In fact, when we define the Ideal as “that which ought to be,” we mean “that which ought to be actual”; for of necessity, the Ideal must “be.” The Actual, then, may or may not be ideal, the Ideal may or may not be actual; but the most complete form of Reality is that which is at once Actual and Ideal.

The true contradictory of the Ideal is the *Unideal*—that which *ought not to be* (Ugliness, Evil, Error). Here again, the Unideal may or may not be actual, and it is in any case Real in some sense at least. But contrary to the above, the most complete form of Reality is that which excludes, or at least overcomes through its opposite, the Unideal.



(c) *Correlations*. Reality, we have seen, covers both Complete Actuality and Possibility, Mere Actuality and Ideality. Actuality and Ideality, also, have been recognized to be not contradictories, but potentially identical. It remains to correlate Ideality with Possibility, and both with the various opposites of Reality. The following results emerge:

Ideals may be Possible or Impossible, and the Possible may be either Ideal or Unideal. For example, Goodness is an Ideal: Actuality presents a condition in the world of what we may call Moderate Goodness—so far the Actual and the Ideal are one; Greater Goodness than at present exists is a Possible Ideal, Absolute Goodness on this earth an Impossible Ideal. Conversely, both Greater Goodness and Greater Badness are Possible—the former an Ideal, and the latter an Unideal, Possibility: a moderate degree of each is Actual, an absolute condition of either in this world an Impossibility.

Correlating Ideality and Possibility with the opposites of Reality, we observe that neither is completely Unreal. The Imaginary may be Ideal or Unideal, Possible or Impossible: the Utopias of the political philosophers, for example, are usually set forth by their proponents as possible ideals, but in each case contain both possible and impossible, ideal and unideal, features. Similarly, Appearances which are not Actual may be Possible or Impossible, Ideal or Unideal: it is possible, for example, for a stick which is “actually” straight, and so appears in the open air, to appear bent if partially submerged in water, and impossible under

those conditions for it to appear straight. Finally, an object that appears beautiful under one light or to one observer, may appear hideous under different conditions or to another observer.

4. *Existence*. Probably the most contested point in ontological terminology today is as to the meaning and extension of the term "Existence." While many identify Existence with Reality or even with Being, as we have conditionally identified the two latter with each other, others would regard the world of Existence as in some sense less extensive (logically speaking) than the world of Reality. Etymologically, "to exist" means "to stand out from," and from this point of view it is hardly correct to speak of the "existence of God"; since if the Reality of God is accepted at all, He is taken as the Source of all other reality, and whatever "exists" "stands out from" Him, while He Himself "is," but can hardly be said to "exist." However, etymology rarely rules in such matters, and it may be wiser to ignore it. When a distinction *is* drawn between the wider realm of Being and the narrower realm of Existence, the latter is usually contrasted with *Subsistence*, and to this contrast we now turn.

(a) Generally speaking, when the distinction is made at all it corresponds to that previously drawn between the Individual and the Universal (I, 3c). Individuals like red houses, beautiful pictures, good deeds, and triangular grass plots *exist*: Universals like redness, beauty, goodness, and triangles *subsist*. So, Substances exist, Attributes and Relations subsist: we speak of

the triangular grass plot as being located in front of the red house, but though both the house and the grass plot exist in the spatial relation asserted, the relation itself subsists.

The chief value of this distinction is that it impresses the truth that universals—attributes and relations—abstractions, if you like—are as real in every sense of that word as are individuals, but of a different type of reality. In these days of the worship of the concrete and “practical,” it is well that we should have impressed upon us that nothing in this very concrete and practical world of ours is any *more* real than what we call, usually with a derogatory “mere,” “abstractions”; that the great spiritual Values, the profound Entities of mathematics, and the other Universals of common thought, are Realities of a type at least as near Absoluteness as the things and persons of “practical” life; and perhaps, even, that the world of Ideas, as Plato taught, is *the* real world, and the world of things but shadows and appearance.<sup>28</sup>


So far we have been dealing with Entities—but what of Events? The France of 1791 existed, but can we say the same of the French Revolution? It was as real as the territory on which it took place, but it seems hardly logical to speak of the Revolution as “existing” in 1791 as Robespierre undoubtedly did in that same year. So, the United States and its President exist today, but can

<sup>28</sup> The core, indeed, of Aristotle's criticism of Plato's doctrine is that the latter treats subsistents as if they were existents on a higher level: subsistents may or may not be “more real” than existents, but they are not of the same nature.

we say that the events of today in the life of the President and the history of the United States “exist”? We speak of events as “going on,” but hardly as “existing.” And yet, just as Universals are at least as real as Individuals, so are Events (Particulars, as we have described them—II, 5) at least as real as Entities—or even, to extreme dynamists like Professor Whitehead, more so. To cover this we need a new term, and, on the analogy of the now much favored “protensity,” may be permitted to speak of the *Prosistence* of Events. Robespierre, then, existed: the Revolution prosisted.

(b) *Non-Existence*, the true contradictory of Existence, becomes, if we accept the distinctions of the preceding paragraphs, not identical with Non-Being or Unreality, as it would be if these distinctions were rejected, but inclusive of Subsistence and Prosistence. To say that something is “non-existent” or “does not exist,” is not to say that it is unreal or has no being at all. Redness and beauty, presidential elections and logical arguments, for example, do not exist—are non-existent, though real: red houses and beautiful sunsets, voters and reasoners, exist; but their qualities, values, and processes have a reality not describable in existential terms. Non-Existence, therefore, includes three possibilities—Subsistence, Prosistence, or Unreality.

TABLE XXVIII



5. *Correlations*. A recent investigator into the problem of what we have called the Modalities of Being is Dr. Alvin Thalheimer,<sup>29</sup> and it may be well to set his solution of this problem over against that which we have been presenting. In the first place, instead of identifying Being, the *summum genus*, with Reality (in its broadest sense, "c"), as we have done, and subordinating Existence and Subsistence as species; Dr. Thalheimer identifies Being with Subsistence (*op. cit.*, pp. 9, 14), and Reality with Existence (pp. 13 f, 102), and makes Reality and Unreality, Existence and Non-Existence (pp. 12 f), the species of Being or Subsistence. He denies the value of the doctrine of degrees of Reality or Existence, and restricts this term entirely to the realm of what we have called "Objective Reality" (pp. 14-16). The lunatic's million dollars, for example, fictitious characters like Ivanhoe and Colonel Newcome, golden mountains, etc., subsist, but they are for him unreal and non-existent in any sense of these terms; whereas triangles, numbers, and relations exist as fully as do horses, red houses, and the President of the United States. Dr. Thalheimer admits, as we do, that the realm of Possible as well as of Actual experience—the other side of the moon as well as this side—is real (pp. 104 f); but he insists on "definite position in time and space" as an essential criterion of Existence or Reality (pp. 102 f), whereas for us only Phenomena are in Time and only physical phenomena in Time and Space (II, 4). Bodies, we say, exist in Space, Events


<sup>29</sup> *The Meaning of the Terms "Existence" and "Reality,"* Princeton University Press, 1918.



prosist in Time; but Noumena (Spirits and Universals) transcend both Time and Space—Spirits in an eternal Existence, Universals in an eternal Subsistence. Dr. Thalheimer, to conclude, does not consider the modalities Becoming, Appearance, the Imaginary, or the Ideal.


## TABLE XXIX

## THALHEIMER'S ANALYSIS OF BEING



Our chief defence for retaining the distinctions of terminology which Dr. Thalheimer and others reject is our insistence upon a twofold truth: (1) that Fictions, Relations, Ideals, etc., are real in at least as true a sense as physical things; but (2) that there are vital differences between the kinds of reality exemplified by the above categories of entities. Mental existence is not the same *kind* of existence as physical, fictions are not real in the same *sense* that facts are, relations and ideals have a different *type* of reality from phenomena, and we need a terminology varied enough to allow for these distinctions; and yet in a very true sense each of these has a right to be considered real. Our own table of concepts, then, would read somewhat as follows:

TABLE XXX  
THE MODALITIES OF BEING



The death of Robespierre, for example, was an actual prosistent fact—the death of Colonel Newcome, an actual prosistent fiction; but each was real, though only the former an event in “objective time and space” (Thalheimer, p. 103). Beauty is a subsistent ideal, partly actualized both in fact and in fiction; but when this actualization occurs, we have beautiful existents like Chartres Cathedral and Dante’s terrestrial paradise, or beautiful prosistents like an Easter Mass at St. Peter’s or a performance of the Ninth Symphony. Chiron the centaur was an impossible fictitious existent, but real just so far: a round square is impossible even in imagination, and so unreal in any sense. The status of the “luminiferous ether” or “ether of space” presents an interesting ontological problem: that this ether has *some* type of Being or Reality is unquestionable, and *if* it is actual it exists rather than subsists; but *is* it actual, and is it ideal or unideal, existent or non-existent, fact or fiction? There seem to be advocates in science for all of these alternatives: to some it is an actual, existent fact; to others an ideal, existent fiction; to still others an unideal, non-existent fiction.

In order not to over-confuse the table, I have omitted Becoming, Appearance, and Potentiality, with its re-

lated concepts; but all of these have been considered quite fully in previous sections. As we have seen, Becoming is always the Appearance of some Entity, and Potentiality but a preparatory stage of Actuality—all that *is* actual *was* potential, and all that appears expresses reality. Furthermore, all that is actual is also possible, and may be necessary. All these distinctions represent degrees rather than kinds of Reality; but the distinctions of Existence and Subsistence, Actuality and Ideality, Objective Reality and Imagination, are distinctions of kind rather than degree.

## V


### Conclusion

1. *Final Correlations.* We have come now to the end of our study of the historic dichotomies and modalities of Being, but before closing we have still before us the task of correlating the various dichotomies and modalities with one another. This, however, I think we shall find to be a relatively easy exercise, now that we have the needed definitions and examples in our hands.

In Part IV we found that the most clear-cut of modality-distinctions was that between Existence, Subsistence, and Prosistence. Similarly, the discussions of Part I revealed that the most fundamental dichotomies are those of Entities *vs.* Events, Noumena *vs.* Phenomena, Universals *vs.* Individuals, Persons *vs.* Things, and Spirits *vs.* Bodies. All we need to do, therefore, is to correlate these two sets of concepts with one another.

Generally speaking, Universals subsist, Individuals exist, Particulars (which we have identified with Events) prosist; and each of these has been logically divided in our previous Part. The correlations, therefore, tabulate as follows:

TABLE XXXI



2. *Metaphysical Implications.* Out of these logical considerations there emerges some such general conception of things as follows:

Reality is ultimately and originally One Absolute Personal Spirit or Subject-Object, GOD, Who, in Fichtean language, "eternally posits His own Being." On His objective side, God is a system of *Universals* or Divine Ideas, which also constitute the Characters of finite Individuals; but on His Subject-side, He is the Supreme Individual, the Individual of Individuals. The *World* is the *Creation* of God in the sense that without Him it would have no Existence, whereas His own Existence is independent of that of the World. Creation is the act whereby God "opposites" to Himself a World, bringing thereby Being out of Non-Being. Without such an act, God would be the Whole of Reality; but in Creation God as Whole or Absolute freely becomes a Part, so that the Absolute as we know it is not merely God, but the system of God and His World. In this System, the relationship is twofold: (1) that of *Tran-*



*scendence*, in that God is the eternal Personal Source of all things, and the world's reality derived from Him; (2) that of *Immanence*, in that God is also the indwelling Principle (Logos) of the world-process.

Creation, however, is but the first step in the process of Becoming, *Evolution* constituting the continuation of this world-process from primeval chaos up to Man. This process is governed by two complementary principles: (1) *Mechanism* (*vis a tergo*), according to which every Event in the world-process is the Effect of some previous Event known as its Cause; and (2) *Teleology* (*vis a fronte*), according to which every Event is a Means through which God attains His Ends.

*Personalities* are the highest instruments of the Divine Purpose, in that every personal being is not merely an Object dependent on external causes and leading to external ends, but also a coöperating Subject, a controlling source of purposive activity, and an end in himself as well as an instrument for the furtherance of universal ends. The world as we know it, therefore, is a system of personalities *immanent* in and continuous with a common material environment on their *objective* side, but also *transcendent* of that environment and distinct from one another as *Subjects*; each having a unique place in the world as an instrument of the Divine Purpose, and at the same time interacting with every other through their common environment in the joint fulfilment of that Purpose.

This Purpose is ultimately the "reconciliation" by God of the world to Himself, the *Synthesis of God and the World*. The "oppositing" (creation and evolution)

of the universe is but a "moment" in the Divine Activity, having as its end the "compositing" (to develop the Fichtean terminology) of that universe with its Divine Source. From this standpoint, evolution is, as has been said by Professors S. Alexander (*Space, Time, and Deity*) and Lloyd Morgan (*Emergent Evolution*), a *nisus*, a striving toward Deity; and God, not merely Source, but End of the world-process. The present stage in Becoming is notoriously imperfect or unideal, but imperfection is by no means inevitably bound up with finitude. Only God, it is true, possesses *Absolute Perfection*; but every creature can, and the purpose of its creation is that it should, attain *relative* perfection, perfection *in its kind*. The End of the world-process, then, is the attainment of Perfection—for the universe at large, as well as for each individual. Such Perfection would be, not a condition of stagnant inactivity, but of ceaseless activity; the free and unhindered exercise of function on the part of each finite individual, in harmonious interaction with every other and with God his Source and End. The realization of this ideal is "the one far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves," and without which the entire world-process in time would be meaningless.

## TABLE XXXII

## THE MOMENTS OF BECOMING

- I. *THESIS*: God eternally posits His own Being. The Absolute = God.
- II. *ANTITHESIS*: God opposits to Himself a World. The Absolute = God + World. (Imperfection: the diversity of the Actual and the Ideal.)
- A. *Creation*: The passage of the World from Non-Being to Being.
- B. *Evolution*: The passage of the World from Thinghood to Personality. (The gradual Actualization of Ideals.)
- III. *SYNTHESIS*: God composites the World with Himself. The Absolute = God-World. (Perfection: the identity of the Actual and the Ideal.)

## Appendix A

### *On the Meanings of "Idealism"*

NO term in philosophical nomenclature is more equivocal than "idealism." In the course of our study we have encountered it in at least four different senses, and in its popular usage the confusion of meanings is hopeless. In this appendix I propose to consider the various more or less legitimate uses of the word, to determine how far each is justifiable, and to suggest alternatives where the term itself seems inappropriate.

The chief source of this ambiguity, after all, is the confusion of "ideas" with "ideals." Is "idealism" properly a doctrine of *ideas* or a doctrine of *ideals*? Certainly the plain man's understanding of the term is in the latter sense, whereas the philosophical concept is rather of the former type. As a matter of fact, however, we need both uses of the term, and yet must avoid the common confusion. This can be done only by considering carefully the various conceptions, and endeavoring to distinguish them by separate terms so far as this may be possible.

1. The first and fundamental sense of the term Idealism is *epistemological*. Here it is a theory of the nature of the object of knowledge, and is opposed to *Realism*. The issue between these two doctrines is as to whether or not we can know anything non-mental. Realism teaches that the object of knowledge is unaffected by

our knowledge of it; that we can know non-mental reality—*things*, as distinguished from ideas. Idealism, on the contrary, teaches that we can know only *ideas*, and that the world which we know does not exist apart from someone's knowledge of it. These doctrines do not pretend to say what reality *is*, but only *what we can and do know*—what that which we know is. Understanding of these theories would be much freer from confusion if we abolished altogether the use of the term Idealism in this sense, and substituted for it Ideism or *Ideism*. It is not a theory of Ideals but of Ideas, as Realism is not a theory of Reality but of Things (*Resism*, not Realism).

R. W. Sellars, in his *Essentials of Philosophy* (p. 147), defines epistemological idealism as the doctrine "that everything known is mental, and that nothing exists which is not known or experienced by some mind." In this definition, however, we have a confusion between epistemology and metaphysics: the second clause is defining a theory of existence, and so refers to metaphysical rather than to epistemological idealism. W. T. Marvin (*A First Book of Metaphysics*, p. 187) distinguishes these as a "broader" and a "narrower" sense of the term: in its "broader" (or epistemological, as we find it to be) sense, idealism asserts that what we *know* is a state of the knowing mind: in its "narrower" (or metaphysical) sense, it asserts that all *existence* is mental, and that "apart from experience there is nothing."

*Metaphysical* idealism, therefore, is the doctrine that nothing exists (not merely, nothing can be known)



which is not experienced by some mind; that reality (not merely the object of knowledge) is of the nature of ideas as distinguished from non-mental “things.” This, too, is more properly to be termed “Ideism,” as opposed to the metaphysical Realism which teaches that reality is independent of the knowledge of any mind, that non-mental things as well as ideas exist. Many philosophers have been at the same time epistemological idealists, holding that we can know only ideas (phenomena), but metaphysical realists, holding that there *is* a non-ideal world of things-in-themselves which we can not know: this is notably the position of Kant, for example.

2. The metaphysical idealism thus defined has for its contrary or “antithesis” (III, 3d) *Materialism*, and is itself commonly known as Mentalism, or (still more commonly, though not so accurately) Spiritualism. In addition to Materialism, Dualism and Neutral Monism are also realistic in admitting the existence of beings which are not minds or the objects of experience; whereas the fundamental tenet of Mentalism is that all reality is ultimately mental or of the nature of conscious experience.

That Mentalism is identical with Spiritualism we have already denied (II, 2; III, 3d). As a matter of fact, both Spiritualism (as taught, for example, by Berkeley) and Phenomenalism (as taught by Hume) are idealistic (or “ideistic”), the former contending that reality consists of persons and their ideas, the latter that only ideas are real and that persons are merely

systems ("bundles") of ideas; whereas even Panpsychism, though mentalistic in insisting that all reality is ultimately psychological, is realistic in regarding conscious personality as a secondary product of infra-conscious impersonal monads, mind-stuff, or what not. Our own Spiritualism, as defined above, is by no means identical with Berkeley's, in that we regard mind and matter as coördinate aspects of phenomena; hence, whereas Berkeley's Spiritualism is also mentalistic, our own doctrine must be sharply distinguished from Mentalism. Finally, we have classified our form of Spiritualism as a variety of Dual Monism (III, 3d): Spinoza's doctrine is also a Dual Monism, but substantialistic rather than spiritualistic in that he neglects in his metaphysics what is to us the fundamental principle of Subject-hood. Hence—

### TABLE XXXIII

#### CLASSIFICATION OF QUALITATIVE THEORIES

##### I. *Idealistic*

- A. Substantialistic Dual Monism (*e.g.*, Spinoza)
- B. Spiritualism
  - 1. Spiritualistic Dual Monism (our doctrine)
  - 2. Spiritualistic Mentalism (*e.g.*, Berkeley)
- C. Phenomenalistic Mentalism (*e.g.*, Hume)

##### II. *Realistic*

- A. Panpsychistic Mentalism (*e.g.*, Leibniz)
- B. Materialism (*e.g.*, Hobbes)
- C. Dualism (*e.g.*, Descartes)
- D. Neutral Monism (*e.g.*, Neo-Realism)

Mentalism, we have seen, may be spiritualistic or non-spiritualistic, idealistic or realistic: Idealism may be mentalistic or dual-monistic, spiritualistic or non-

spiritualistic: Spiritualism may be mentalistic or dual-monistic, though all Spiritualism is idealistic. If, then, Mentalism, Spiritualism, and (metaphysical) Idealism, which are so often identified, are not really the same doctrine at all, it is highly desirable that our terminology should be so clarified as to obviate this confusion, keeping each term within its proper bounds, and not speaking of Idealism when Mentalism or Spiritualism is more accurate.

3. In a broader and perhaps more vital sense, Idealism is opposed to the whole naturalistic or mechanistic trend of some schools of contemporary philosophy (I, 9h, 10b). In this sense its true opposite is *Naturalism*—the doctrine which regards the concepts of science as ultimate, attempts to explain everything in purely mechanistic terms, and rejects the principle of teleology. Over against this Naturalism we set the view that philosophy is concerned with purposes, values, meanings, rather than with causes, phenomena, facts—with teleological interpretation rather than with mechanistic explanation. Idealism in this sense, as says J. A. Leighton (*The Field of Philosophy*, p. 277), teaches “that the structure and drift or meaning of reality, taken as a whole, is the partly actual and partly possible expression and instrument of purposes and ideals.” Or, as E. Albee puts it, “the teleological standpoint, that of inner meaning or significance” is for idealism “the standpoint of philosophy itself.”<sup>30</sup> For

<sup>30</sup> *Philosophical Review*, vol. 18 (1909). Quoted by Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 38.

this doctrine the specific term Teleological Idealism or *Transcendentalism* may be used: Transcendentalism does not deny the reality of phenomena, but merely insists that Reality in its most complete and final sense involves *something more than* phenomena, that appearances express some deeper “underlying” Reality, and that all Reality has a teleological significance.

4. Finally, we have that use of the term Idealism which we find in the fields of ethics and æsthetics, literary and dramatic criticism, etc. This is the only sense in which the term “idealism” itself is precisely applicable, and its true opposite is *Actualism*. As stated by Wm. Jerusalem (*Introduction to Philosophy*, translated by Sanders, p. 209), *æsthetic* idealism aims to “lift mankind to higher spheres,” and “to unfold the profounder depths of man’s nature”; while *ethical* idealism “finds the end of moral effort in ideals rather than in existing realities” (p. 259). In other words, Actualism would find the standards of moral conduct, of beauty, and of literature, drama, and the fine arts in general, in the actualities of everyday nature, life, and character; whereas *Normative Idealism* (as we may, when necessary to avoid confusion, specifically name it) would bid the agent and the artist set before themselves ideals which transcend the world of actualities.

The two latter varieties of Idealism are no doubt closely allied, as are also the first two varieties with each other; but transcendentalism is rather a metaphysical program than a specific theory, normative idealism a theory in the fields of ethics and æsthetics.

## Appendix B

### *On the Nature of Matter and of Substance*<sup>31</sup>

#### I

PHILOSOPHICALLY, at least since the time of Descartes, the term "matter" has always stood for that type of Reality which is universally objective—*i.e.*, a common object of experience to all experiencers having the necessary organs and instruments for observation; for that type of Reality which is extended or "spread out" in space, and is known through the bodily senses. Physical science, too, has in the past always regarded Matter as for its purpose an ultimate concept, irreducible to anything else and comprehensive of all other physical concepts; but the tendency of modern developments in the field of physics has been to reduce Matter to the situation of one among two or more co-ordinate concepts—as Energy, Ether, or Electricity—and still more recently to think of it as derived from and reducible to one of these. We have, then, first of all in the history of physical science, Matter as supreme and ultimate concept; then Matter and Energy, Matter and Electricity, Matter and Ether, or some larger grouping of these, as distinct and coördinate fundamental concepts; and finally the thought of Matter as itself ultimately not matter at all but Electricity, or as

<sup>31</sup> Read in slightly different form before *The American Philosophical Association* at its Annual Meeting in December, 1924.



reducible to Energy, or as composed of strains or vortices in the Ether.

Let us examine these four fundamental concepts of physics—Matter, Electricity, Energy, and Ether—and see if we can construct a doctrine of Substance which will unify them, and at the same time be entirely conformable to the latest scientific theories.<sup>32</sup>

Matter, contemporary physicists seem to agree, is composed ultimately of units of Electricity, these units being of two kinds—Electrons (or negative electrons) and Protons (or positive electrons); but when we go beyond this preliminary statement we find no uniformity. The tendency, surely, is to identify Electricity with Energy, or to reduce all forms of Energy to electrical energy, and so ultimately to reduce Matter to Energy; but the relation between these three concepts is decidedly obscure in the minds of the writers on the subject. And as for the Ether, there is no agreement as to its nature, its existence, or the necessity of postulating it. We hear ardent relativists insisting that Einstein's work has completely refuted and annihilated the Ether: on the other hand we find Professor Dayton S. Miller defending it on experimental grounds, Sir Oliver Lodge upholding it on psychical as well as physical

<sup>32</sup> Of the numerous recent presentations of the contemporary conception of the structure of matter, written by scientists for those who are not scientists, we may cite especially an article by Sir Oliver Lodge in the *Nineteenth Century* for January, 1924 (vol. 95, pp. 137 ff.). With this may be cited another article by the same author in *Nature*, vol. 112, pp. 185 ff. (August 4, 1923); and a more speculative paper by H. F. Wyatt in the *Nineteenth Century* for February, 1924 (vol. 95, pp. 288 ff.).

grounds, and others on the fence and refusing as yet to commit themselves on the question. It is necessary for us, however, though with becoming diffidence and modesty, to take some stand on these matters, recognizing all the while that whatever conclusions we may attain are speculative, and subject to modification whenever any further advance may be made in scientific knowledge. With this caveat, we proceed to construct a provisional doctrine.

Adopting and adapting a suggestion of Professor Albert P. Mathews, F. A. A. A. S., we may appropriate the term "*Etherions*" for whatever may be the really ultimate unanalyzable elements of things, regarded as units of the Ether or "strains" in the Ether. *Ether* becomes, then, the fundamental concept of physics, the undifferentiated Substance from which all things proceed, and may be understood as equivalent to the "pure Space" of the earlier thinkers, and the Space-Time of S. Alexander and the relativists.<sup>33</sup> The *Etherions* first become differentiated into Electrons and Protons, *Electricity* thus being the first stage in the diversification of the Ether.

*Matter* is a sensible modification of Ether—Ether so organized as to be perceptible to the senses. Being composed, according to the accepted theory, of units of Electricity, which themselves, as noted above, are differentiations of Ether, Matter is therefore the second stage in the diversification of the primal Substance.

<sup>33</sup> The former identification has already been suggested by numerous writers. S. V. Ramamurty in *Nature*, vol. 109, p. 75 (January 19, 1922), identifies Ether with Matter-Space-Time.

Now, anything may be considered either statically or dynamically (as Entity or as Event), and should be considered from both points of view if our understanding of it is to be complete. Our previous analysis has been static, viewing Substance as Entity only. From this we proceed to suggest that *Energy* is not a concept coördinate with Matter, or even logically prior to Matter, but Substance viewed dynamically—Ether in action; and electrical energy, the most fundamental form of Energy. Whatever is said, then, of Matter or Ether may be equally said of Energy from the dynamic side. Our analysis, accordingly, may be symbolized in the following formula:

## TABLE XXXIV

SUBSTANCE: *Ether* (= Etherions) < *Electricity* (Electrons + Protons) > *Matter* —————> Bodily Senses

## II

Innumerable commentators on these most recent developments in our understanding of matter have interpreted them as tending toward the spiritualization of matter, a modifying of the harshness of the older dualism between Matter and Spirit. This interpretation, however, misses an important point. Electricity, Energy, and Ether are as objective or trans-subjective as Matter itself, whereas Spirit is essentially Subject (II, 3). The estimate referred to is a reversion to the primitive conception of Spirit as merely a subtle or highly rarefied form of Matter—of God as what Haeckel called Him, a “gaseous vertebrate”; but how-

ever completely we may refine our conception of Matter, we shall never thereby succeed in transforming it into Spirit, pure Object into transcendent Subject.


Nevertheless, there is one thing to be said for the common interpretation. *Pure* Subject is non-existent: "no Subject without Object" all philosophers will admit, however they may differ as to the truth or significance of the converse. The concept of Substance we have seen to be the fundamental *objective* category, and have asserted that Matter, or "whatever Matter may turn out physically to be," is the only Substance; but that Spirit is a higher type of Reality than Substance, and "the only ultimately real Being"—*i.e.*, that type of Being from which all others derive their reality (II, 3). Spirit must objectify itself, and Substance is the objectification of Spirit. The new theories of Matter *do*, then, reduce the antithesis between it and Spirit on the latter's *objective* side, though the Subject-side of Spirit remains irreducibly apart.

Sir Oliver Lodge has suggested (*loc. cit.*) that our bodies are composed of Matter and Ether, and that Mind acts directly on the etherial part and only indirectly on the material part. But if Matter is merely the sensuous modification of Ether, the first clause can only mean that the peculiar configuration of Ether which I call my body is only partly perceptible to the senses. The second clause represents Sir Oliver's solution of the Mind-Body problem; but it is hard to see why it should be any easier for Mind (regarded as Subject) to interact with Ether than for it to interact with Matter, and the parallelists' objection to causal

interaction would seem to bear as heavily against this theory as against the traditional form of interactionism. If, however, the interaction between Subject, Spirit, Soul, and Object or Mind-Body is not one variety of causal relation, but a unique relation of Ground and Expression as suggested in our text (II, 3), the difficulty disappears.

The "spiritual world," then, is the world of Spirits and Ideal Values, which interpenetrates the "material world" or world of Bodies and their Factual Characters (Qualities, Relation, and Factual Values—*cf.* II, 5, 6). Objectively, these constitute not two distinct worlds, but one continuous interpenetrating universe of Substance, which expresses in various manners and degrees the Subject-aspect of Spirits—ultimately of the Divine Spirit, and secondarily of human Spirits.

TABLE XXXV





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




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